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Measures imposed on the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation, and Parks (MECP) 
have compelled the provincial agency in Ontario, Canada, to seek policy alternatives in 
carrying out its enforcement duties. Addressing this problem is important to the public, 
whose welfare is paramount, and to MECP managers, who must contend with the budget 
cuts. Smith’s social comparison theory provided the framework for this qualitative 
research study, in which the perceptions of MECP policy advisors regarding the 
applicability of social comparison as a policy tool to influence private sector firms to 
practice corporate environmental responsibility (CER) was explored in relation to air 
emissions policy. Data were extracted through semistructured interviews with a 
purposeful sample of nine participants. The data were manually analyzed using attribute, 
structural, and pattern coding techniques. The findings stipulate that for-profit firms 
become environmentally proactive due to societal and market pressures, industry norms, 
financial incentives, future potential strict regulations, risk management, technological 
advancement, and environmental certifications. Furthermore, the applicability of a social 
comparison policy would depend on the types of emissions and firms being compared, 
implemental scale of the policy, the level of public interest on the emissions, 
accountability and dependability of the submitted information to prevent misleading 
reporting, also known as greenwashing, and governmental support for firms at the bottom 
of the ranking to avoid corporate apathy and defeatism. Social change implications may 
be the promotion of broader CER practices in the corporate community by policymakers, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
In this research study, I explored the applicability of incorporating social 
comparison theory into public policy to nudge for-profit firms to be more 
environmentally responsible. The reasoning behind the study is multifaceted. On the one 
hand, public expectations of businesses to be good corporate citizens have heightened 
since the global financial crisis of 2008; on the other hand, there is an enhanced demand 
for efficient and effective government. Meanwhile, the use of social comparison as a 
nudging policy tool to influence individual environmental behavior has become more 
prominent. The prospective policy application of this theory to nudge corporate behavior 
could improve environmental policy outcomes, ameliorate administrative effectiveness, 
and promote corporate environmental responsibility (CER). 
The social change implications of the study are extensive. While researchers have 
focused on environmental policy, social comparison could be applied to other policy 
areas as well, such as labor practices, pay equity, and other issues related to corporate 
socially responsible behavior. This could eventually shape a competitive ecology in the 
private sector that encourages institutions to exceed their regulatory and legal obligations, 
enabling public agencies to be more efficient, while ensuring public welfare is 
safeguarded. The result could be that of a mutually beneficial scenario for all 
stakeholders, including administrators, corporate actors, and the public. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The background of the study is first 




research question, and the theoretical and conceptual framework are considered. The 
nature of the study, relevant definitions, and assumptions are then examined, followed by 
the scope, delimitations, limitations, and significance of the research. 
Background 
There is a substantial amount of existing literature on behavioral economics, 
social comparison, and CER. Public administrators regularly use pecuniary tools to 
incentivize environmental behavior. These tools are easy to enact and produce quick 
results but are not without shortcomings. For instance, the Canadian federal government 
offers rebates of up to $5,000 to the public for purchasing electric vehicles, but there has 
been much backslash from the media that the administration has spent nearly half of its 3-
year budget in 8 months (Morello, 2020; Rabson, 2020). After the Ontario conservative 
government canceled the electric vehicle incentive program implemented by the previous 
liberal administration, the sales of electric vehicles plummeted by 55% (Jones, 2019). 
The evidence strongly indicates that economic policy tools are not always politically 
welcomed or sustainable. 
In academia, some researchers have also expressed reservations around the use of 
monetary tools. Ouvrard and Spaeter (2015) asserted that market-based policy 
instruments, including government-imposed fees, quantity restrictions, and taxation, have 
drawbacks such as lobbying pressures from industrial interests. Additionally, these policy 
instruments are often not socially acceptable. In the United States, oil industry lobbyists 
valiantly opposed the tax credits for electric vehicles in Congress, as the policy would 




recognize the instant effects on consumer behavior and react strongly against any 
economic policy unfavorable to their interests. With the use of nudges as a 
complementary or alternative nonmonetary policy tool, there are double benefits. Not 
only it is inexpensive to implement the policy, but also it is a response to the social 
pushbacks (Ouvrard & Spaeter, 2015). As the public importunity for effective 
government increases, this proposition is greatly appealing to policymakers. 
The application of behavioral economics has thus been a rising trend in many 
aspects of environmental policy. Croson and Treich (2014) discussed that nudges have 
been used in both individual and corporate contexts, and the concept of bounded 
rationality is the main driver of the application. Particularly, some of these nudges use 
social influence to affect individual energy and water usage habits by comparing 
consumption data in the neighborhood, and the impacts have proven to be significant; 
nudges based on social comparison can provide a powerful alternative to economic 
instruments (Croson & Treich, 2014). Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) agreed with those 
assertions, adding that these nudges engender voluntary behavior in environmental 
protection and that information and education alone are not always adequate or 
efficacious. Hence, the idea of bypassing the human cognitive system to alter behavior 
through nudges is increasingly popular (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). Through literature 
review, Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) illuminated the differences among the uses of 
label, request, and social context and found that the herding effect has a remarkable 
impact on energy conservation. This herding effect lends argument to the core of this 




Leon Festinger was the first proponent of the social comparison theory. The U.S. 
social psychologist hypothesized that human beings are naturally driven to evaluate their 
capabilities and pay great attention to situations where others are somewhat close to them 
(Festinger, 1954). Individuals consequently tend to change their positions to be closer to 
others in the group to rectify any perceived discrepancies. Festinger’s seminal work 
provided the bedrock for social comparison research, which has progressed over the 
decades to enrich the initial framework (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Kruglanski & 
Mayseless, 1990; Suls et al., 2002; Wheeler, 1966; Wills, 1981). The historical 
developments not only appended to the original theory, but also settled debates among 
scholars about the meaning of social comparison. 
There is strong indication in recent literature that the social comparison process is 
becoming highly relevant in the corporate world. Liu et al. (2018) posited that for-profit 
firms are prone to isomorphic pressures. These pressures urge the firms to model 
themselves on one another and emulate one another on carbon management (Liu et al., 
2018). There are three principal types of isomorphic processes: coercive, normative, and 
mimetic (Liu et al., 2018). Using questionnaires to survey random for-profits firms, Liu 
et al. found that mimetic and normative processes, which come from competition and 
standardization respectively, are stronger in influencing firms to undergo changes than 
the coercive processes derived from regulations. The efficacy of social comparison is 
intrinsic to the outcomes of the processes, and I deconstruct these concepts and connect 




One of the major conundrums associated with using behavioral economics to 
nudge CER is the moral question: Are firms practicing CER for ethical reasons? Lampert 
(2016) argued that when firms demonstrate socially responsible behavior, society sees it 
as a form of business ethics, but it is emphatically erroneous because that would be 
considering corporate entities as moral agents. Lampert inferred that firms undertake 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) for reasons of political aspirations and not moral 
goodness; thus, rather than seeing CSR as an ethical capacity, it should be viewed 
through the lens of politics (Lampert, 2016). On the contrary, some firms appear to 
display ethical capabilities when confronting disastrous situations as they undertake 
humanitarian efforts and other CSR activities (Fernando, 2007). Such polarizing division 
in scholarship on corporate morality is conspicuous and I present further scrutiny of this 
in Chapter 2. 
Other scholars have related CER to market considerations. Khojastehpour and 
Johns (2014) investigated the impacts of environmental CSR on brand reputation and 
profitability, and through literature review, they discovered a positive relationship 
between the two aspects. Park (2019) also explored the impacts of CSR on corporate 
reputation related to customer satisfaction and attitude in the aviation industry. Park’s 
(2019) study was carried out with questionnaires sent to airline customers, and the results 
indicated a significant connection between corporate reputation and CSR practices. 
Corporate reputation is critical to firms, and some go to great lengths to stand out from 




example (Bursztynsky, 2020). There is no governmental intervention in these 
arrangements, but solely the corporate ambition to differentiate. 
These well-founded correlations between CER and financial performance, 
however, are not a cue that administrative involvement can be omitted. Alavi et al. (2016) 
dissected the significance of private industry self-regulation in managing CSR due to the 
perceived regulatory gaps and absences in government regulations and the possibly 
higher effectiveness in private regulations. Despite its increased popularity, the 
effectiveness of self-regulation remains questionable because of the multidimensional 
nature of CSR, so a multilevel approach that considers various factors is necessary (Alavi 
et al., 2016). 
This multidimensional nature has other implications as well. Fisher et al. (2016) 
studied the international application of CSR and how globalization affects the practice. 
Using CSR scores, they compared corporations among continents on various types of 
CSR, such as governance, environmental, and social (Fisher et al., 2016). They reckoned 
that differences do exist across international geographical regions, and these distinctions 
could be caused by cultural, social, political, and economic factors (Fisher et al., 2016). 
The context-dependent essence of CER suggests a tailored approach to any prospective 
policy application using social comparison. 
The existing literature has verifiably demonstrated the prevalence of social 
comparison in influencing both individual and corporate environmental behavior, but the 
application of the theory in public policy and its effectiveness have been limited to the 




might be administered as a policy tool to nudge CER, which is the gap in knowledge I 
aimed to fill with this study. This endeavor was needed in the field of public policy and 
administration research because nudging could enhance administrative efficiency while 
protecting the public. This could mean more value for the money for taxpayers without 
sacrificing welfare or deviating from the missions of public agencies. 
Problem Statement 
In Canada, the Progressive Conservative Party was elected into power in June 
2018, governing Ontario for the first time since 2003. To fulfill an election promise, the 
new premier confirmed that the administration would reduce spending by billions of 
dollars across the entire government (Parkinson, 2018). Every ministry was affected. The 
2019 budget of Ministry of the Environment, Conservation, and Parks (MECP) was 
brought down by $350 million (Ontario Budget, 2019). The austerity was quite drastic 
because the amount was equivalent to 35% of the agency’s previous year’s budget. 
One of MECP’s key functions affected is regulatory enforcement. Environmental 
officers normally attend business properties to check if the firms are compliant with 
regulations, but the budget cut has made this difficult to carry out, especially in rural 
regions of the province requiring extensive travel for site visits. A policy alternative has 
become necessary because of the need for better administrative efficiency while 
protecting the environment in times of fiscal frugality. A possible solution is to 
incorporate social comparison into environmental compliance. 
Throughout human history, people have always compared among themselves. 




now than ever (Alfasi, 2019; Chow & Wan, 2017). A powerful psychological impact is 
associated with such comparison, and governments have begun to recognize its potential 
as a policy tool. In fact, administrators now use social comparison to influence 
individuals in reducing energy consumption, which has produced successful outcomes 
(Croson & Treich, 2014). However, there appears to be little research on how social 
comparison might be used as a policy tool to influence corporate environmental behavior. 
Scholarship has attested that institutional isomorphism exerts pressure on firms to mimic 
one another on environmental management (Liu et al., 2018). This presents a potential 
opportunity for public administrators as they might be able to encourage these dynamics 
through policy. This research may fill the knowledge gap by exploring the relevance of 
social comparison as a policy tool to nudge for-profit firms to be more environmentally 
responsible. The inquiry was achieved by understanding environmental policymakers’ 
perceptions on the matter. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative research was to explore the possible usefulness of 
social comparison in air emissions policy for promoting CER practices among private 
sector industries in Ontario, Canada. In-depth, semistructured interviews with MECP 
policy advisors produced data regarding their thoughts on using social comparison, a 
form of behavioral economics, in air emissions policy. The findings are reported in 
Chapters 4 and 5 to consider the applicability of a social comparison policy in nudging 





The research question for the study was: What are the perceptions of MECP 
policy advisors on the applicability of social comparison in air emissions policy to nudge 
for-profit firms to practice CER? 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework for the Study 
The primary theoretical framework for the study was based on Festinger’s social 
comparison theory. Festinger (1954), a U.S. social psychologist, hypothesized that human 
beings are often enticed by situations where others are similar to them because they have 
the innate desire to assess their capabilities. If people perceive there are discrepancies 
after comparison, they are inclined to change their behavior and decision making to be 
closer to others. 
Since its inception, the initial theory has undergone copious advances. Wheeler 
(1966) suggested the concept of upward comparisons when self-improvement interests 
may prompt one to compare with others who are superior or better off in some way. 
Building on Wheeler’s hypothesis, Gruder (1971) discovered a multifactor model to 
account for comparison choices, with the factors being uncertain, positive, and/or 
desirable. Goethals and Darley’s (1977) attributional analysis brought further clarity into 
the theory, asserting that the inference of one’s own and others’ ability from relative 
performance is imperfect because performance is determined by effort and practice as 
well as ability, so the attribution regarding ability is ambiguous. 
In response to Wheeler’s upward comparisons, Wills (1981) posited that self-




be inferior, engendering downward comparisons. Later, the conceptual and empirical 
developments in cognitive social psychology have called for the classical social 
comparison theory to be further expanded; people may lack the desire to compare and the 
comparison tendencies appear to be highly fluid (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). 
Additional researchers have argued that comparison can produce positive and negative 
contrastive and assimilative effects, and such impacts have become ever more prevalent 
in the social media era (Alfasi, 2019; Chow & Wan, 2017; Suls et al., 2002). The 
evolution of the theory has shown that it is primarily used to address human behavior and 
decision making. 
Undisputedly, Festinger’s theoretical work and its succeeding advancements have 
been prevalent in all aspects of social phenomena, including behavioral economics and 
the nudge theory. Social comparison is so effective as a form of nudging that 
governments have begun to use it as a policy tool to successfully influence individual 
energy usage, typically by providing feedback information about consumption data 
(Croson & Treich, 2014). This theoretical approach provided the foundation determining 
the applicability of the theory in environmental policy in the corporate context. In other 
words, in this study, I investigated a new application on a decades-long theory. 
The conceptual framework that also formed the structure of this research includes 
behavioral economics and CER. Behavioral economics is concerned with the impacts of 
human decision making on economic behavior based on various psychological, cognitive, 
social, and cultural factors (Lin, 2011). This field of study dates the 18th century, with 




et al., 2005). Smith was instrumental in constructing the concept, which is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 2. 
Self-interest and the desire to align with the norm have particular significance in 
the paradigm of behavioral economics, supporting the social comparison argument that 
individuals and firms take themselves, and others, into consideration when they make 
economic decisions (Ashraf et al., 2005). There are three main rationalities involved in 
the decision-making process: bounded, unbounded, and erotetic (Bendor, 2010; Dunn, 
1997; Shakun, 2001). These rationalities are commonly applied to human thinking and 
could be independent of each other or relate to one another, but for-profit firms seem to 
exhibit those traits as well. 
When a focal firm compares its own environmental practices to other target firms, 
whether direct competitors or similar organizations, the comparison generates mimetic 
isomorphism that pressures the focal firm to imitate or copy the target firms intentionally 
or unintentionally (Kim & Tsai, 2012; Liu et al., 2018; Roszkowska-Menkesa & 
Aluchna, 2017). This mimicking allows the focal firm to remain competitive and 
legitimate, dominated by its exigency to survive and follow the industry norm. The 
rationalities manifest as underlying characteristics in the practice of CER, and these 
connections are analyzed further in Chapter 2. 
The idea that social comparison and CER practices rely on corporate perceptions 
about industry reputation, brand image, customer expectations, competition, and 
legitimacy means that behavioral economics should be employed in a contextual manner, 




differently, so it is up to the policymakers to decide how social comparison might be used 
in which contexts, such as the policy types, industry characteristics, economic conditions, 
and so forth. This justifies the pursuit of a qualitative methodology for the study to attain 
the subjective views of policy advisors on the prospective policy application. 
The theoretical and conceptual framework of the dissertation, including 
behavioral economics, social comparison, and CER, are all subjected to individual firm 
perceptions, confirming that the qualitative approach and research question were suitable 
for the study. The research tradition was generic qualitative inquiry as I sought the 
perceptions of policy advisors. The data analysis used attribute, structural, and pattern 
coding techniques in two coding cycles due to the straightforward answers from the 
participants. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of the study was qualitative. I sought the perceptions of MECP policy 
advisors on the possibility of taking advantage of the business competition dynamics to 
nudge for ubiquitous CER practices in the form of social comparison. Therefore, the key 
concepts investigated were social comparison and CER in a policy context. The ontology 
was relativist because each advisor had their own views on the effectiveness of such 
policy tool. 
Epistemology was the backbone of the study. Epistemology typically deals with 
the nature of knowledge and how it is acquired (Burkholder et al., 2016). In this case, the 
knowledge was gained by interviewing policy advisors in an in-depth, semistructured 




context constructed a form of collective reality about the applicability of such policy. As 
a result, the epistemology was constructivist. I substantiated the explication to code the 
attributes, structures, and patterns of the data, giving lucidity to the meaning of the new 
knowledge. 
The logic concludes that an inductive and exploratory qualitative paradigm was 
the most fitting approach. This also connotes that a generic qualitative inquiry design 
with purposeful sampling strategy was the ideal path because it would allow me to build 
a subjective truth by garnering individual perceptions from those who could best answer 
the research question and fill the knowledge gap. 
To conduct the research in a naturalistic setting consistent with the epistemology, 
my original plan was to set up the interviews in conference rooms inside MECP, but 
outside the policy advisors’ offices. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all interviews were 
conducted online via a video conferencing platform. This might have given the advisors 
confidence and comfort to speak more candidly about their views and whether they 
thought it would be effective to use social information to nudge private sector firms in 
further lowering their emissions. I then analyzed the gathered data using attribute, 
structural, and pattern coding techniques, and extracted patterns in the data to reach 
conclusions. 
Definitions 




Behavioral economics: A field of study concerned with the impacts of human 
decision-making processes, including psychological, cognitive, social, and cultural 
factors, on economic behavior (Lin, 2011). 
Bounded rationality: A concept in the decision-making process that the rationality 
of an individual is limited by the information available and the cognitive limitations of 
the person’s mind (Bendor, 2010). 
Coercive isomorphism: An element of institutional isomorphism that includes 
direct or indirect pressures of other organizations that a firm is dependent on, including 
applicable laws and regulations, and cultural expectations of society (Liu et al., 2018; 
Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). 
Corporate environmental responsibility (CER): A form of corporate governance 
in which a firm surpasses its legal responsibilities, voluntarily and proactively, to protect 
the natural environment in a sustainable manner (European Commission, 2011; Global 
Affairs Canada, 2019; World Bank, n.d.). 
Erotetic rationality: A concept in the decision-making process that the rationality 
of an individual is to mitigate ignorance by expanding one’s boundary of knowledge 
through a series of rational questioning and answering (Dunn, 1997; Koralus & 
Mascarenhas, 2013). 
Institutional isomorphism: A process of structural homogeneity that molds 
organizations within an area of institutional life to become more similar to one another to 




legitimacy in terms of social and economic prowess, for customers and resources as well 
as political power (Shepard et al., 1997). 
Mimetic isomorphism: An element of institutional isomorphism that refers to a 
firm’s intentional or unintentional modeling of other peer organizations that are more 
legitimate or successful (Liu et al., 2018; Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). 
Nonmarket valuation: A psychological tendency of evaluating the environment 
with some degree of favor or disfavor, without economic justification (Hawcroft & 
Milfont, 2010). 
Normative isomorphism: An element of institutional isomorphism rooted in 
professionalization and standardization, driven by education and interactions within 
professional networks (Liu et al., 2018; Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). 
Social comparison theory: A phenomenon in which humans have the inclination 
to alter their decision making and behavior to be closer to others when compared to those 
who are somewhat different, but not too divergent, from them (Festinger, 1954). 
Unbounded rationality: A concept in the decision-making process that the 
rationality of an individual is based on spirituality and connectedness through 
consciousness to solve problems (Shakun, 2001). 
Willingness to accept: The minimum amount an individual is willing to accept to 
give up a commodity (Shogren & Taylor, 2008). 
Willingness to pay: The maximum amount an individual is willing to pay for a 





In any qualitative research, various assumptions need to be addressed. These 
assumptions are out of the researcher’s control, but without them, the study would be 
irrelevant (Simon, 2011). There were two major underlying qualitative assumptions in 
this study. First, it was assumed that the participants were truthful and straightforward 
during the interviews. Second, by selecting policy advisors who specialized in air policy, 
climate change policy, and environmental economics as participants, I assumed that their 
collective perceptions were adequately representative of MECP’s position as a whole 
because the research problem was organizational. This approach in turn should be 
sufficient in answering the research question. 
There were epistemological assumptions in the study as well. The epistemological 
assumption supposes that subjective evidence is assembled by the researchers getting as 
close as possible to the participants being studied, so it becomes important to conduct 
studies in the field (Creswell & Poth, 2016). By conducting interviews by video in a 
virtual platform with the advisors located at places of their choice, it was presumed that I 
was close enough to the interviewees’ workplaces that the data were accurate and of good 
quality. 
There are two other conceptual assumptions in the study. First, it is unclear if the 
social comparison phenomenon is more prevailing in some industries than others, so it is 
assumed that institutional isomorphism is similarly present in all for-profit industry 
sectors. Second, the definition of CER as elucidated in this paper is based on the social 




through the same lens. These conceptual assumptions are necessary because the research 
does not target any specific industry sectors for the social comparison policy application, 
and because the geographical context is a Canadian province, the relationships between 
the government and industries are expected to be different from those in more traditional 
societies (Jeong & Kim, 2020; Uddin et al., 2018). Such relationships play into the 
political motivations behind CER and will be examined in Chapter 2. 
Scopes and Delimitations 
To understand the boundaries of a study, the scopes and delimitations must be 
defined. Delimitations are characteristics that limit the scope of the research, so unlike 
assumptions, they are under the researcher’s control (Simon, 2011). The context in which 
this research was investigated provides those insights. 
For the first time in 15 years, Ontario is governed by the Progressive Conservative 
Party. The sudden change in political climate has presented considerable challenges to 
the regulatory practices among ministries. Specifically, MECP is facing issues with 
carrying out its enforcement duties. This area needs to be addressed because, since the 
days of the liberal administration, the goal has been to turn MECP into an enforcement-
oriented agency; the budget cuts by the conservative government have made that target 
more difficult to achieve. This research might help address the problem as behavioral 
economics could improve administrative efficiency and save costs. Compliance with air 
emission standards is a significant portion of MECP’s work, so focusing on this policy 




Exploring the applicability of social comparison in industrial air emissions 
required the input of policy advisors at MECP. Their expertise in environmental 
economics and/or air emissions policy was elemental to the relevance of the data, so they 
were the sole participating population group. The corporate executives were excluded 
from the study as this dissertation was authored from the public policy and administration 
standpoint. Moreover, although there are three elements of institutional isomorphism, 
including coercive, normative, and mimetic processes, this research initially focused only 
on mimetic processes and, to a lesser extent, normative isomorphism as social 
comparison is the theoretical foundation, so the coercive aspects were excluded from the 
initial coding framework. 
The potential transferability of the study is prodigious. Although the policy 
context in this case was air emissions policy, the application might be germane in other 
media of industrial contaminants as well, such as waste and wastewater. It might also be 
apposite in other social policy issues such as labor practices and pay equity. Depending 
on the cultural and social implications of CER, some form of corporate social comparison 
in public policy might be felicitous in other jurisdictions as well. 
Limitations 
Comprehending the limitations helps to delineate the potential weaknesses in a 
study. One key limitation to the research design was the privacy of the participants. 
Because the interviewees were Ontario public servants, their names and contact 
information were a matter of public record on the government website. MECP, the 




the potential participants. To reasonably mitigate this concern, the advisors were named 
P1, P2, P3, and so on to mask their identities. 
Another limitation was the transferability and dependability of the research. The 
data were collected within a single public organization, so to ensure triangulation, policy 
advisors from three separate disciplines, including air policy, climate change policy, and 
environmental economics, participated in the study, so multiple data sources were 
established. All interview questions were also free of geographical context and designed 
as a generic structure, so the data might reasonably be more transferable to other social 
and cultural settings. 
Researcher bias was minor. I do not work in behavioral economics or air 
emissions policy, so I did not gain or lose from the research personally or professionally. 
Regardless of the outcome of the data analysis, I saw the study as a great opportunity to 
potentially fill a knowledge gap in the literature, so it did not matter to me whether the 
policy advisors supported, opposed, or were divided on the topic. I openly included all 
positive, neutral, and negative cases in my analysis. 
Significance 
In this study, I aimed to contribute to the literature by exploring the various ways 
of incorporating social comparison into one public policy issue of nudging for-profit 
firms to be more environmentally responsible. It may be an important endeavor in the 
public policy and administration literature because nudging could enhance administrative 
efficiency while protecting the public. Perhaps administrators could then concentrate on 




social change implications could be that enforcement officers no longer need to chase 
compliance on a regular basis and instead could support new businesses, which could 
benefit the economy. At the same time, public well-being could remain safeguarded. 
Summary 
The austerity measures imposed on MECP as a result of a government change 
have compelled the environmental agency to amend its ways of carrying out enforcement 
duties. As it becomes more challenging for provincial officers to visit industrial sites to 
ensure compliance, behavioral economics, particularly social comparison, could be a 
potentially useful policy tool to nudge industries to undertake CER, exceeding their 
regulatory obligations. By doing so, a competitive ecology might be created to promote 
broader CER practices in the private sector and might allow MECP to shift their efforts to 
support new businesses, while ensuring regulations are still met. 
The existing literature emphasizes that social comparison has been successfully 
applied in environmental policy to influence individual behavior, and the phenomenon is 
also common in the business world, but its use in public policy to nudge corporate 
environmental behavior remains unexplored in the existing research. Through generic 
qualitative inquiry, purposeful sampling, and the use of attribute, structural, and pattern 
coding techniques, I intended to fill that knowledge gap by interviewing MECP policy 
advisors to obtain their perceptions on the issue. There were three different data sources 
to address dependability and triangulation, and the interview questions were free of 
geographical context, so they should help address transferability. As there was no conflict 




After an overview of the study, the next step is to scrutinize the current literature 
surrounding behavioral economics, social comparison, and CER to establish a detailed 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In Ontario, MECP’s budget was cut drastically by the conservative government in 
fiscal year 2019. The severe austerity has impelled the agency to retrench its spending 
and operations. One major impediment is that it has become more difficult for 
enforcement officers to visit industrial properties to check for regulatory compliance in 
person. A policy alternative is imperative in the interest of addressing the budget 
reduction, improving efficiency, and above all, safeguarding the environment. Social 
comparison could be applied to environmental compliance as a possible solution. 
Throughout history, humans have always compared among themselves as a means 
of self-evaluation. In the age of social media, social comparison has come to great 
prominence, even causing depression in individuals (Alfasi, 2019; Chow & Wan, 2017). 
Despite the negative psychological impact, governments have started to realize the power 
of the process and have employed social comparison as a policy tool to successfully 
nudge people in reducing energy consumption (Croson & Treich, 2014). However, there 
is scant research on applying social comparison as a policy tool to influence corporate 
environmental behavior. 
Evidence has shown that firms emulate one another on environmental 
management because of isomorphic pressures, so there could be a policy opportunity for 
the Ontario government to promote these dynamics (Liu et al., 2018). Hence, in this 
research, I aspired to fill the knowledge gap by investigating how applicable social 




firms. To answer the research question, I sought to understand environmental 
policymakers’ perceptions on the matter. 
The purpose of this qualitative research was to explore the perceptions of MECP 
policy advisors on the usefulness of social comparison in air emissions policy to 
encourage broader CER practices in the province of Ontario, Canada. Through in-depth 
interviewing with the advisors, data were generated to understand their thoughts on the 
use of social comparison in air emissions policy. The ontological assumption was 
relativist because each policy advisor had their own views on the effectiveness of such 
policy tool. The epistemological assumption was constructivist as I interviewed the 
advisors, in a semistructured format, to gain knowledge on their perceptions surrounding 
social comparison. The findings are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 in relation to the 
applicability of social comparison as a policy tool to nudge for ubiquitous CER practices 
in the private sector. 
The current literature seems to emphasize the impacts of social comparison on 
individual decision making and behavior. After the theory’s inception in 1954, there has 
been a sea of literature advancing the philosophy from the human perspective. Since the 
1970s, scholars began to elucidate the concept of institutional isomorphism as a driver of 
CSR, which occurs when organizations in a field compete with one another for 
institutional legitimacy in terms of social and economic prowess, for customers and 
resources as well as political power (Shepard et al., 1997). This definition is related to 




From a different angle, CSR has been described as a multidisciplinary concept 
that reflects a firm’s response to the expectations and demands of a wide range of 
stakeholders, including society, the environment, and individuals (Yuan et al., 2020). The 
various interpretations of CSR have led some researchers to conclude that there is a lack 
of theoretical foundation and coherence in CSR research because of its complexity and 
context-dependent nature (Wang et al., 2020). Despite the differences within academia, 
there have been attempts to construct a conceptual framework surrounding institutional 
isomorphism and CSR (Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). Nonetheless, there is 
minimal literature on how isomorphic pressures induced by corporate social comparison 
could be fostered through public policy. This apparent lacuna in the academic policy 
research establishes the relevance of the problem under study. 
The literature review is organized as follows: Because social comparison is a form 
of behavioral economics, I first discuss the concept of behavioral economics, including 
bounded, unbounded, and erotetic rationalities and the associated policy applications. I 
then home in on the social comparison theory and its history of development, along with 
the CER concept and the five main factors that influence the decision making behind the 
practice. Next, social comparison in a corporate context engendered by institutional 
isomorphism, the three elements of isomorphic pressures, and the potential benefits and 
shortfalls of a corporate social comparison policy are analyzed. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The Walden Library and Google Scholar were the primary tools used in the 




restrictions were applied in the advanced search of the Walden Library. Many keyword 
searches were conducted, including behavioral economics, bounded rationality, 
unbounded rationality, erotetic rationality, nonmarket valuation, social comparison, 
social comparison policy, corporate social comparison, isomorphic pressures, 
institutional isomorphism, anticompetitive practices, corporate environmental 
responsibility, and corporate social responsibility. The iterative search process started 
with the theoretical and conceptual framework, using terms such as behavioral 
economics, social comparison, institutional isomorphism, corporate social responsibility, 
and corporate environmental responsibility. The reference lists in the chosen articles 
were then reviewed to identify additional relevant literature. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
Behavioral economics as a concept has been around for centuries. During the 
classical period of economics between the late-18th and mid-19th centuries, human 
psychology was strongly associated with economics. Scottish economist and philosopher 
Adam Smith first proposed in 1776 that individuals have no interest in using their assets 
unless the profits bear some proportion to the extent of those assets, demonstrating the 
preponderance of self-interest in economic behavior. In an earlier publication, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith went a step further and asseverated a dual process in 
human decision making. Smith (1759) theorized that humans make moral decisions based 
on concerns for the happiness of self and others, which is caused by the impartial 
spectator that controls the passionate actions of oneself for the purpose of being 




consider the views of others and may help deter one from being overtly selfish when 
making decisions. 
Smith’s work laid a critical foundation for behavioral economics research. In the 
20th century, economic psychology emerged from the works of economists such as 
George Katona (1951), who contrasted habitual behavior and genuine decision and 
expounded that one should not assume the existence of rational human behavior in 
microeconomic analysis. Katona, considered one of the founding fathers of the traditional 
behavioral economics, criticized conventional economists for paying little attention to the 
psychological foundations of economic behavior (Katona, 1951). For example, 
economists predicted that rapid inflation would emerge after World War II ended because 
people had been saving money during the war, causing the demand to far exceed the 
supply, but that forecast did not materialize (Katona, 1951). Using survey data from 1945 
and 1946, Katona adduced that people felt optimistic about their own financial situations 
as well as the economic consequences after the war ended, so they did not overspend and 
the inflation never occurred (Katona, 1951) This neglect by mainstream economists about 
consumer perspectives motivated Katona to describe a psychological approach to 
economic analysis and intricately link economics to psychology. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, economics research has become 
increasingly sophisticated. Incorporating behavioral economics into environmental 
policymaking has been a growing trend (Croson & Treich, 2014; Garai, 2017). Such an 
application is based on the notion that environmental issues invoke strong moral feelings 




and this knowledge would lead to bounded rationality that may subsequently affect 
behavioral patterns (Croson & Treich, 2014). The ethical undertone of applying 
behavioral economics to environmental policy is key in nudging individuals to change 
their behavior and decision making because they know and understand, within their 
bounded rationality, that it is morally wrong to pollute. 
Bounded rationality is a concept in the decision-making process that the 
rationality of an individual is constrained by the information available and the cognitive 
limitations of the person’s mind (Bendor, 2010). The idea was initially articulated by 
U.S. economist Herbert Simon, who challenged that rationality is bounded because there 
are limits to the human thinking capacity based on time and available information 
(Simon, 1957). Put another way, an individual’s ability to comprehend the information 
presented to them and the amount of time restricted for them to understand the 
information affect their subsequent decisions. In the context of environmental behavior, 
by knowing the adverse impacts of unsound practices and the urgency for corrective 
actions, a person may tend to make better environmental decisions. 
Nonetheless, bounded rationality does not always bring about positive decision 
making. The individual cognitive limitations imply that if a person is unable to make 
sense of the information communicated to them, then they may not act in accordance 
with the intent of that information (Rugeley & Gerlach, 2012). One example is the 
phenomenon of climate change skepticism; some people continue to deny the existence 
of climate change, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence supporting it and 




complexity of the environmental domain, so citizens might default to quotidian 
experiences to form opinions (Rugeley & Gerlach, 2012). For instance, people often 
confuse the distinction between climate and weather, so the involuted topic of climate 
change has led some to opine that because they see the weather change all the time, 
climate change is nothing to be worried about. These cognitive shortcuts are common and 
can lead to poor decision making or snap judgments that precipitate behavioral failure. 
Another important contribution from Simon is a model of decision making that 
aids in the understanding of collective choice in organizations, signifying the entrance of 
behavioral economics into the field of public policy and administration. In the seminal 
publication, Administrative Behavior, Simon (1947) provided the basic formulation on 
the tenets of bounded rationality. An organization man strives to satisfy rather than 
optimize because their capacity to solve complex problems is very small compared to the 
size of the problem, the solution to which requires objective and rational behavior 
(Simon, 1947; Simon, 1957). The relationship between human bounded rationality and 
organizational decision making is inherently causal. 
The second form of logic, unbounded rationality, is applied in decision making as 
well. It is based on spirituality and connectedness rather than information and can be a 
salient factor in determining the path an individual chooses (Shakun, 2001). In the world 
of postnormal science, where complexity, contradictions, uncertainty, and ignorance are 
dominant themes, people often need to make decisions well before any conclusive 
evidence is available (Sardar, 2015). Inevitably, they must reach beyond the boundaries 




Indeed, while bounded rationality deals with the limits of human understanding in 
the presence of information, unbounded rationality is associated with the limits of human 
knowledge. No one knows it all, and when decisions must be made in the absence of 
concrete data, the affective and conative faculties come into play (Shakun, 2001). The 
connections to one’s own instincts, feelings, and attitudes may propel one to do the right 
thing, which essentially makes it an ethical decision. 
This moral compass frequently guides behavior, and scholarship has defended 
that the phenomenon also occurs in the private sector. In the wake of the Asian tsunami 
in 2004, two Sri Lankan firms donated $100 million in relief funds, built houses, 
refurbished hospitals, constructed water wells, and undertook other CSR activities 
(Fernando, 2007). Through in-depth interviewing, the executives of the two firms 
explained that they wanted to provide what was appropriate and right to their compatriots 
according to their conscience, and it was more than an emotional experience for them 
(Fernando, 2007). This high degree of genuine virtue was augmented by the firm 
executives’ concern that their actions might be perceived as taking advantage of the 
tragedy; one of the firms mounted a carefully crafted awareness campaign to insist that it 
did not exploit the disaster (Fernando, 2007). The firms’ disquiet about public perception 
of their honorable actions signaled some kind of moral goodness, but it could also stem 
from their need to protect their business image. 
Notwithstanding their admirable behavior, it was believed that the Sri Lankan 
firms acted because the tsunami was a significant event, and it was predicted that, as time 




(Fernando, 2007). This prognosis was supported by the divergent views among firms 
about CSR before the tsunami (Fernando, 2007). In a later investigation involving in-
depth interviewing with 10 additional Sri Lankan firms, Fernando and Almeida (2012) 
uncovered that, despite the tsunami, strategic CSR initiatives and organizational 
virtuousness were not all voluntary. These actions could be influenced by the country’s 
religious culture, and in practice, the firms ultimately wanted to deliver some level of 
shareholder value as well as societal value (Fernando & Almeida, 2012). Extraordinary 
times call for extraordinary actions, but it would appear that the genuine intentions of 
executives were maneuvered by circumstances. 
These articles on the Sri Lankan example have enabled the synthesis that while it 
is evident calamities could catalyze firms to act with unbounded rationality, there remains 
the question: if there is no apparent crisis, or the crisis is not apparent to them, are firms 
still capable of genuinely practicing CER, or are there other factors that they need to 
consider? Like bounded rationality, the unbounded version of thinking does not always 
beget positive outcomes in human behavior (Shakun, 2001). To that extent, it is logical to 
deduce that this could happen in firms as well. After all, firms are managed by humans. 
This chapter will dig deeper into the moral agency of firms and other elements that 
influence their environmental decisions. 
The third type of reasoning is erotetic rationality. It deals with the nature of 
questioning and answering in the face of ignorance, so the boundary of knowledge can be 
expanded (Dunn, 1997). It could be seen as a heuristic form of thinking that is above both 




Let us absorb the concept for a moment by comparing it to the other two 
rationalities. In bounded rationality, an individual makes decisions based on what and 
how quickly they can grasp about the information at hand. When the rationale is 
unbounded, the individual makes decisions that are spiritually dependent when they do 
not have that information. For erotetic processes, the individual does not make any 
decision until they have done further research because they do not understand or know 
enough. Thus, different from bounded and unbounded rationalities, in both of which a 
person does not intent on learning more, the limits of human knowledge and intelligence 
would in effect prompt the erotetic response of truth seeking to come to a more informed 
decision. 
How does the erotetic principle work exactly? When we encounter new premises, 
we systematically ask selected questions as we interpret the premises (Koralus & 
Mascarenhas, 2013). These questions make us rational, and they induce conversations 
and social pressure to find the proper answers (Koralus & Mascarenhas, 2013). Our 
natural desire for strong answers makes us reasonable, which turns into our ability to ask 
the right questions (Koralus & Mascarenhas, 2013). This becomes a cycle of questioning 
and answering until we understand the premises, so that we can reach a decision. 
Erotetic rationality is abundantly observed in everyday life. When a CNN 
journalist saw Rube Goldberg machines, he understood what was happening and found 
them fascinating, but he did not know the significance of these machines (Sutter, 2012). 
He began to wonder what made them so compelling, so he interviewed a Rube Goldberg 




questioning and answer seeking, the journalist discovered that the designer’s purpose was 
to copy human behavior as much as possible, in a nonhuman way (Sutter, 2012). The 
inquiry added insight to the investigation, expanding the jouranlist’s knowledge about 
Rube Goldberg machines. 
Understanding the similarities and differences of these three rationalities is 
fundamental to behavioral economic policymaking because policy compliance hinges on 
how citizens decide to act upon the policy in question. Venkatachalam (2008) affirmed 
that environmental economics should be based on both bounded and unbounded 
rationalities to prevent policy failure as the actual human behavior shows both 
characteristics substantially. The mainstream economic models treat individuals as 
unboundedly rational, which is not a valid approach because they do not behave this way 
(Venkatachalam, 2008). Curiously, Venkatachalam went on to use a corporate 
phenomenon, called status-quo bias, to prove their point. 
The status-quo bias is a habitual occurrence. It arises from the preference of 
staying in the status-quo position and has incurred great environmental costs 
(Venkatachalam, 2008). Oftentimes, industries tend to stick with outdated pollution 
control technologies, even though they know there are more updated and efficient ways 
to mitigate emissions (Venkatachalam, 2008). As a result, policymakers need to take such 
behavioral factors into consideration to bring about more effective policy outcomes 
(Venkatachalam, 2008). The article did not specify how policy actors should take these 
factors into account, but it ratifies the idea that firms can unquestionably exhibit 




same human motivations that guide their strategic decisions (Jones, 2002). Hence, the 
focus of behavioral environmental economics has been on nudging for behavioral 
changes from different angles, as opposed to educating the stakeholders with numbers 
and statistics alone. 
Erotetic reasoning has a parallel concept in that regard. In discussing the need to 
probe the boundary of knowledge, Dunn (1997) stressed that ignorance stemming from 
cognitive impairment impacts not only individuals, but also organizations including 
corporations. Conformity imposed on institutions foments such impairment, which blinds 
people to the need for probing possible solutions to problems (Dunn, 1997). Dunn’s 
contention that ignorance affects firms as well as individual actors not only adds credence 
to the causal relationship between human rationality and organizational decision making 
discussed earlier, but also conveys that gradual expansion of knowledge is the best way 
to mitigate ignorance. 
In public organizations, the presence of erotetic rationality in policy design has a 
long and endured tradition. Charles Lindblom’s seminal article, The Science of Muddling 
Through, declared that policy changes must be incremental rather than revolutionary due 
to the limits of human intelligence (Lindblom, 1959). The more recent public policy 
research has concurred that in the incremental model, which includes erotetic rationality, 
administrators devise and implement policies that are at first satisfactory and not 
necessarily rational, but negotiations are part of the decision model that activates the 
process of choosing the best policy (Ticu, 2013). Policymakers must also operate under 




through questioning and answering, reduce the risks and costs of those uncertainties 
(Anyebe, 2018). 
These articles have yielded the discernment that scholarship has historically built 
on Lindblom’s work to describe what policymakers must do to solve social problems, and 
erotetic rationality has been underscored more than other types of reasoning. This is an 
unsurprising revelation because bounded and unbounded rationalities could be deemed 
irrational due to the limits of human intelligence and knowledge, and the complexity of 
societal issues means the problems cannot be resolved with a single method, but multiple 
iterations to achieve optimal policy solution. 
Though these authors used public policy analysis as the context, it is also 
applicable in the setting of this research as the articles have provided some insights into 
how firms might make environmental economic decisions. Like unbounded rationality, 
firms could be subjected to decision making based on conformity or status-quo bias. 
Unlike unbounded rationality, erotetic reasoning could mitigate the denial of ignorance 
by means of additional information. Therefore, the use of behavioral economics in 
environmental policy could bypass this unbounded ignorance by nudging firms to make 
favorable economic decisions because of their business instincts or their erotetic desire to 
learn more about the feasibility of economic actions that are beneficial to the 
environment. Firms might also make decisions based on bounded rationality if corporate 
managers are not concerned about or unable to apprehend the scope of the environmental 
challenges, so supplemental and relevant information might trigger their erotetic thinking 




Other scholars have resonated with these assertions. Ölander and Thøgersen 
(2014) concurred that the provision of information alone on environmental issues is not 
always a successful way to instigate behavioral changes on the grounds of too much 
information and the rapidly evolving environmental field. Because nudging incorporates 
the unconscious and automatic processes in human psychology, in addition to the 
conscious and reflective ones, it has been a more effective tool than pure information 
provision in effectuating behavioral changes as it takes all aspects of the human nature 
into consideration (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). This is a reasonable assessment by the 
authors because information is often used to invoke bounded rationality, intellectualizing 
decision making. 
While in some cases it is a fruitful scheme, if the information provided is 
inadequate or difficult to process, an individual could revert to the instinctive lizard-brain 
thinking and make decisions that may seem irrational, leading to the status-quo bias, 
which is related to unbounded rationality. Thus, the information provided should be 
adequate to provoke erotetic rationality, or bypass bounded and unbounded rationalities, 
and minimize behavioral failure. 
Not every economist agrees that behavioral economics should be applied to 
environmental policy. According to Shogren and Taylor (2008), some economists have 
argued that people can learn to be rational by reason of market forces and evolution, as 
the market is more rational than an individual is and makes better decisions on resource 
allocations. The problem with that argument is, when it comes to environmental goods 




economics to dictate environmental behavior (Shogren & Taylor, 2008). As an example, 
an individual may commit littering at the risk of a fine, perhaps because the person thinks 
the chance of them getting caught is low, so it would be more worthwhile for them to 
take the risk than making the effort to find a rubbish bin if one is not nearby. This 
mentality of worthiness could be unbounded rationality if the individual does not know 
what the fine is. It could also be bounded rationality if the penalty amount is known, but 
the person still chooses to litter simply because they are indolent. In either scenario, there 
is no monetary calculation to support the decision to litter. 
This lack of economic justification is known as nonmarket valuation. It is a key 
construct in the decision-making process and one of the prime examples of behavioral 
failure (Shogren & Taylor, 2008). In the environmental context, nonmarket valuation is a 
psychological tendency of evaluating the environment with some degree of favor or 
disfavor as people often do not have core preferences about the environment (Hawcroft & 
Milfont, 2010). Such level of favoritism does not appear to be backed by any economic 
valuation, but it is motivated by personal perceptions and beliefs. 
The noneconomic motives drive the behavioral intentions behind environmental 
decisions, so promoting environmental policy requires an understanding of these 
underlying reasons (Bartczak, 2014). To better interpret the noneconomic motives, some 
researchers have advocated the use of stakeholder analysis and cognitive mapping to 
apply nonmarket valuation in environmental policy (Kontogianni et al., 2012). Others 
have endorsed the contingent valuation methods to capture the heterogeneity in 




In any case, these articles have imparted additional sagacity into the tools that policy 
actors might use to nudge for behavioral changes. 
Using the littering example once again, if administrators realize that unfavorable 
environmental attitudes are the main cause of people leaving their garbage behind, a 
coordinated awareness campaign about the benefits of living in a clean neighborhood, 
such as lower chances of a viral outbreak and higher quality of drinking water, could 
nudge those noneconomic motives to the positive spectrum, in addition to the littering 
fines. 
Nonmarket valuation has also contributed to other phenomena. Because market 
values cannot be assigned to environmental goods and services, there is often a disparity 
between “willingness to pay” and “willingness to accept” behaviors in society (Bartczak, 
2014; Shogren & Taylor, 2008). Let us delve deeper into the denotations of these two 
types of behavior. 
In economics, willingness to pay is the maximum amount that an individual is 
willing to pay for a commodity, whereas willingness to accept is the minimum amount 
that an individual is willing to accept to give up a commodity (Shogren & Taylor, 2008). 
Ideally, both amounts should be about equal for the exact same commodity, but research 
has shown that it is often not the case because the buyer and seller may value the same 
commodity differently, resulting in value discrepancy (Shogren & Taylor, 2008; 





In environmental terms, what this entails is that some individuals may see the 
environment as an essential commodity or asset to society, so they would be willing to 
put in additional efforts or spend extra money to protect it, such as participating in 
Greenpeace missions or installing solar panels in their properties on their own dime. By 
contrast, other individuals may see environmental protection as a hindrance or nuisance, 
so they would be willing to put in only the minimum efforts just to obey the law and 
avoid troubles with the government, such as not littering. This begets the phenomena 
where some individuals become very proactive, or even activists, in environmental 
protection, while others are merely following the law. 
This willingness gap can be quite noticeable in a society where divergent 
environmental views are pervasive, but it can be justified by the three rationalities. In 
some cases, individuals may base their environmental decisions on the climate scientific 
information that they already know and understand, so bounded rationality would be the 
best explanation. In other circumstances, people may be motivated by their spiritual or 
personal views about the Earth without the need for climate change evidence, so 
unbounded rationality would be the most obvious. Some individuals could also invoke 
erotetic rationality to search for additional climate change data before they make their 
decisions. All these rationalities are omnipresent in society and govern the willingness 
gaps in all aspects of human behavior and decision making. 
One might see the presence of this willingness gap among corporate entities as 
well. Some firms are high achievers and considered industry leaders in environmental 




just comply with the regulations (Tench et al., 2018). This adds credibility to the 
submission that nonmonetary elements are critical contributing factors in behavioral 
environmental economics, and this is where social comparison could come into play and 
help close the willingness gap. 
Social Comparison Theory 
The social comparison theory hypothesizes that human beings are constantly 
driven to evaluate their abilities, and the availability of comparison with others, whose 
abilities are somewhat different from one’s own, will produce tendencies to change one’s 
evaluation of the ability in question (Festinger, 1954). It is also postulated that a person is 
less attracted to situations where others are very divergent from them than to situations 
where others are close to them (Festinger, 1954). This evinces that human beings are 
social animals. They do not wish to be quite different from others who are like them, ergo 
they have the proclivity to follow the crowd with those similar in abilities to be 
comparable to one another or to belong to the cohort. 
Economic values are not factored into those predispositions to follow the crowd 
though. As a matter of fact, there was no deliberation in the Festinger (1954) article that 
individuals would give monetary wealth a great deal of consideration when it comes to 
decision making influenced by social comparison. According to Duesenberry (1949), 
who first stipulated the pertinence of social network in influencing individual decisions 
on consumption, people who experience relative deprivation when compared to those 




Individuals often do not mind spending more money to upgrade their status to 
remain comparable to others. As a result, in communities where social comparison is 
successfully applied, individuals who previously had vastly different values on the same 
commodity would now see that commodity with values similar to others, closing the 
willingness gap. This is consistent with the idea that bounded rationality, unbounded 
rationality, and nonmarket valuation could significantly influence behavioral patterns. 
Since its inception, the initial framework of social comparison theory has gone 
through many advances triggered by the debates over Festinger’s work. Wheeler (1966) 
averred the concept of upward comparisons when self-improvement interests may prompt 
one to compare with others who are superior or better off in some way. To validate 
Wheeler’s hypothesis, Gruder (1971) created a bogus personality trait scale that informed 
the subjects regarding the scores in their group. He discovered that the subjects selected 
to compare themselves to those who were similar in rank order, clarifying the previous 
works of Festinger and Wheeler (Gruder, 1971). He also proposed a multifactor model to 
account for comparison choices, with the factors being uncertain, positive, and/or 
desirable (Gruder, 1971). Goethals and Darley (1977) ended the dispute on similarity 
interpretations with their attributional analysis, which brought clearer focus to the theory. 
They asserted that the inference of one’s own and others’ ability from relative 
performance is imperfect because performance is determined by effort and practice as 





In response to upward comparisons as presented by Wheeler, Wills (1981) posited 
that self-enhancement interests may cause one to compare with those who are inferior to 
oneself, effecting downward comparisons. The subsequent conceptual and empirical 
developments in cognitive social psychology have called for the classical social 
comparison theory to be expanded, that people may lack the desire to compare and the 
comparison tendencies appear to be highly fluid (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). Further 
studies have propounded that comparison can enkindle positive and negative contrastive 
and assimilative effects, which are more prevalent in the social media era (Alfasi, 2019; 
Chow & Wan, 2017; Suls et al., 2002). Hence, since 1954, numerous researchers have 
contributed to the evolution of the social comparison theory as the behavioral economics 
research progresses. However, the focus has been on individual behavior rather than 
corporate undertaking. 
How effective, then, is social comparison when applied to public policy? Ouvrard 
and Spaeter (2015) studied the use of nonmonetary policy tools to nudge behavioral 
changes, with social comparison used to reduce individual energy consumption. The 
authors found that roughly half of the households were concerned with their own energy 
consumption against the mean consumption of their neighbors (Ouvrard & Spaeter, 
2015). From an individual application perspective, social comparison appears to have 
been successful in producing results. 
It is worth mentioning that nudges are noncoercive, so individuals should not be 
penalized if they decide to continue their polluting way (Ouvrard & Spaeter, 2015). 




which are hard lines that must not be crossed. Instead, it should be applied in situations 
where there are no, or no longer, needs for strict compliance, but as an encouragement to 
improve on the existing conditions. By going above and beyond, firms take on more 
environmental responsibilities than they are legally required, incorporating CER practices 
into their operations. 
Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
The concept of CER originates from CSR. It is a form of corporate governance 
that has been developing since the early 1970s and has attracted much attention around 
the world thanks to its pragmatic and enlightened approach to business practice and the 
promotion of corporate citizenship (Zondorak, 1991). CER as a separate term began to 
appear in the 1980s, often discussed alongside CSR, when a firm’s environmental 
responsibility became progressively important, though it was mainly seen as a practice of 
compliance with laws and regulations. Zondorak (1991) recalled that CER in the 1980s 
was based on conformity and undertaken due to legal and civil liabilities, so firms 
endeavored to do just enough to meet the minimum requirements. 
As the 1990s approached, it was recognized that such strategies would likely not 
be sufficient in combating future environmental challenges. Proactive measures, such as 
the Valdez Principles, were necessary within the corporate community to urge firms to 
adhere by a certain code of ethics, such as reduction of waste and environmental risks, 
sustainable use of natural resources, protection of the biosphere, and so on (Zondorak, 





Such assertiveness in handling environmental affairs pushed the CER concept to 
further evolve over the decades, although until today, it still does not have a commonly 
accepted definition as it depends on the context in which it is applied. According to the 
World Bank, CSR is a business commitment to contribute to sustainable economic 
development by working with employees, their families, the local communities, and 
society at large to improve their lives in ways that are good for business and for 
development (World Bank, n.d.). The European Union defines CSR as a concept whereby 
firms integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interactions with stakeholders on a voluntary basis (European Commission, 2011). The 
Government of Canada also views CSR as voluntary activities undertaken by a firm, over 
and above legal requirements, to operate in an economically, socially, and 
environmentally sustainable manner (Global Affairs Canada, 2019). Notice that World 
Bank defines CSR with more specifications, whereas the other two organizations are 
more generic in their descriptions, so one might cognize the perceived incertitude over 
what CSR means. 
The main commonality of these more modern definitions though is that firms are 
putting in additional efforts to benefit the society at large and doing more than their 
typical responsibilities. The voluntary nature also suggests that businesses are proactive 
in taking steps to exceed expectations. Drawing from the above three sources, this is the 
definition of CER that the dissertation is based on: A form of corporate governance in 
which a firm surpasses its legal responsibilities, voluntarily and proactively, to protect the 




A firm’s willingness to integrate CER into its business operations undoubtedly 
tells its plan to make consistent and tangible progress to benefit society, rather than mere 
compliance. Because CER comes from a voluntary internal decision, a firm must weigh 
in certain factors associated with the initiative, as with any other business decisions, to 
determine its value. 
Factors Influencing CER Decisions 
Incorporating CER into corporate business strategy is by no means an automatic 
undertaking. Environmental protection has traditionally been viewed as a matter of public 
interest and external to private life, so public administrators are customarily tasked with 
the chief responsibility of ensuring proper environmental management (Mazurkiewicz, 
2004). Consequently, firms are required to adhere to sets of regulations and they are free 
to pursue their business interests within the limits of those regulations. 
Although the roles have changed in recent years, and firms have started to 
recognize the cruciality of their active participation in environmental protection, they 
continue to take various factors into consideration before deciding whether to be 
proactive in their environmental governance. For policymakers, it is vital to examine 
these factors and understand how firms behave regarding their environmental 
responsibilities, so policies could be formulated accordingly to inspire sustainable 
practices. In the current literature, scholars have looked at the potential drivers of CER 
from five main positions: moral agency, normative behavior, political motivations, social 




Moral Agency and Normative Behavior 
Environmental matters are often regarded as ethical issues, and society assigns 
such integrity on businesses as well as individuals. But can morality be applied to a firm 
in the same manner as to a person? Researchers have long submitted that a firm’s main 
responsibility is to increase profits. The U.S. economist, Milton Friedman, stated in the 
influential essay, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, that the 
doctrine of social responsibility lies in the acceptance of socialist views, so market 
mechanisms are inappropriate for allocating resources, but they should be set up by 
political machinery (Friedman, 1970). Later, Corvino (2006) avouched that in situations 
where business ethics matter the most, doing the right thing does not pay, while doing the 
wrong thing is better for business. Mintzberg (2007) supported this notion that the most 
profitable firms place the least emphasis on social responsibility. There is consensus 
among earlier works that moral and business decisions are not innately compatible. 
In more recent studies, scholars have also maintained that CSR cannot be wholly 
associated with ethical values. Vetterlein (2018) elucidated that corporate responsibility 
is situated between regulations and moral considerations because the term ‘responsibility’ 
refers to the act of responding to a claim. The relational nature of responsibility evokes 
the expectations of what responsible behavior means in a given context, so one should be 
cautious in attributing CSR to moral intentions (Vetterlein, 2018). Cheng-Guajardo 
(2019) contended that ascribing moral agency to corporations is just our way of using 
metaphor, but we should be wary of taking this route as it undermines our understanding 




for real intentional actions. As it has been discussed in this chapter, based on earlier 
research, human rationality and organizational decision making have a causal relationship 
(Jones, 2002). These later publications have boosted our understanding that while 
humans are capable of making moral choices, organizations are not as they are not 
conscious, so corporate decisions might be viewed as business strategies that have moral 
consequences, instead of ethical decisions themselves. 
There is media influence in the attribution of moral agency to firms as well. 
Lampert (2016) asseverated that although firms are frequently treated as entities capable 
of making moral decisions, and, in the media, moral agency is imputed to firms and 
organizations in a manner that is similar to personhood, such as ‘Volkswagen was caught 
cheating in emission tests’ or ‘Canada signs new climate change agreement with the 
U.S.’, it is a mistake to assign moral responsibility to organizations because they are not 
moral persons, and ergo are not moral agents (Lampert, 2016). While doing what is right 
and what is profitable seem to be the same thing theoretically, in reality that is simply not 
true (Lampert, 2016). Hence, the author stressed that CSR should not necessarily be 
rooted in ethics, but in normative behavior (Lampert, 2016). The drawback of the article 
is that the behavior described is based on regulatory conformance, that if a firm sees the 
others are complying with the law, then it would do the same (Lampert, 2016). This 
contradicts with our definition of CER because the firm is already compliant, but one 
might see how the idea of normative behavior may be of use here. 
Doing what is the norm, rather than what is right, could be an effective driver for 




competitive with one another, and such norm could be a form of ethical behavior. 
Therefore, if CER is publicized as a norm within an industry, one should expect firms to 
react to it. This is not in any way suggesting that for-profit firms are inherently immoral, 
but that the moral approach may not be as effective in environmental issues owing to the 
primary economic factors. 
This also does not imply that firms undertake CER simply because others are 
doing it. There must be some type of incentive involved because a firm exists to make 
money. Nevertheless, Lampert (2016) went on to mislabel the normative behavior of 
compliance as a form of politics, that the legal requirements are a firm’s political 
aspirations. This is a faulty logic because legal conformance is not political, but a 
necessity to avoid prosecution and penalties. One shall thus look at a firm’s political 
motivations in a different light. 
Political Motivations and Social Power 
There could assuredly be political motives behind the practice of CER. Garriga 
and Melé (2004) discussed the political theories related to CSR, and one of the principles 
of corporate governance is what is referred to as the “social power equation”. It expounds 
that if a firm does not exercise its social power, it will lose its position in society, and 
other firms will take over that space, because society demands responsibility from 
businesses (Garriga & Melé, 2004). Accordingly, losing the social position might equate 
to losing the public’s respect. 
This reasoning plays into the politics that could drive CER practices because it 




social position. Jamali and Mirshak (2007) also agreed that the desire of a firm to be a 
responsible societal actor may motivate its social responsibility actions. In studying 
multinational firms, it was discovered that 79% of corporate respondents questioned 
whether their goods and/or services had environmental value to society, and applied that 
knowledge in their decision making, which means these firms were aware of their 
obligations and that they were dependent on the society to exist (He & Chen, 2009). 
These articles have further reinforced the belief that firms acknowledge their 
accountability not only to their shareholders, but also to society at large. Having a good 
environmental standing among members of the public, even when they are not direct 
customers, is indispensable to business success. I will revisit the connections between a 
firm’s environmental reputation and its business performance later in this chapter. 
There is another angle to look at the political underpinnings of CER. Using the 
United States as context, a CEO who has liberal beliefs might consider a democratic 
President to have similar values towards social issues, so the trust in government would 
prompt them to channel socially responsible work intentionally, and they would be less 
likely to protect those values (Jeong & Kim, 2020). If the executive feels that those 
values are under threat by a republican President, they would, ironically, be more likely 
to engage in CSR (Jeong & Kim, 2020). As with any other social actions, there could be 
an ingredient of activism in CER practices. Corporate executives might feel a sense of 
duty to protect moral goodness in the face of opposition that threatens their values, but 
they might be less compelled to do so when the political climate favors their beliefs, 




This complements our earlier analysis on the willingness-to-pay and willingness-
to-accept behaviors: the practitioner’s perceptions on the value of the environment and 
the situation could heavily influence their behavior and decision making. On the other 
hand, in more traditional societies, the political motivations behind CSR practices and 
disclosures are intricately linked to seeking and maintaining ties with the ruling party 
(Uddin et al., 2018). Such desire of alliance seems to be radically different from the 
practices in advanced nations, where firms could fight back against the government to 
safeguard socially responsible practices. These contrasts confirm that not only CER 
undertakings are dependent on context, but also there are governmental connotations in a 
firm’s decision whether and how to practice and report CER activities. 
Market Considerations 
The fifth factor, market considerations, has perhaps the most direct impact on 
corporate decision making. Croson and Treich (2014) professed that some industries have 
become proactive in incorporating CER into their business strategies, in which they 
voluntarily integrate environmental concerns into their daily operations and stakeholder 
interactions, due to the fact that their consumers care about environmental goods and are 
willing to pay more to consume green products, so these firms are willing to reduce their 
emissions to please their customers. Meng et al. (2016) interrogated CER from an 
economic standpoint and posited that the level of competition has a profound impact on a 
firm’s ability or willingness to undertake CER. If a firm faces extremely strong market 




fewer slack resources to invest in environmental programs, so the average level of CER 
would be lower (Meng et al., 2016). 
On the flip side, if the market power is very weak, the firm would most likely be 
monopolistic with a well-established brand identity, and because there would be very 
little threat or competition, there is no pressure for the firm to invest in CER (Meng et al., 
2016). As a result, the authors suggested that CER would be more frequently embraced 
when the competition is moderate or in neither extreme of the market power spectrum, 
because the resulting competitive advantage would be more pronounced and outweigh 
the costs of implementation (Meng et al., 2016). 
These articles have revealed that while firms are generally concerned with how 
consumers view their environmental records and are willing to do what they can to 
appease the public, there are market limitations that constrain their proactiveness in 
environmental governance. Firms do not necessarily wish to engage in environmental 
philanthropy just because they have enough financial means. If doing so might give them 
an advantage over their competitors in terms of public perception without sacrificing their 
bottom line, then the probability of exercising CER would become higher. 
More recently, the literature has evolved in the sense that researchers have 
affirmed a positive correlation between CER and market competitiveness. Analyzing the 
existing survey data with unique firms, Bardos et al. (2020) realized that CSR has a 
greater effect on product market perception in competitive industries, so CSR gives a 
firm competitive edge in differentiating its products. By improving the stakeholder 




the relationship between CSR and firm leverage, Sheikh (2019) also found that CSR 
increases firm value, but only when the competition is high, whereas in low competitive 
markets, CSR has no impact on firm value. By all means, there is an unquestioned 
connection between CER and market conditions, and it appears that whether the 
competition is high or moderate, firms have the incentives to practice CER for the 
purpose of gaining business advantage over others. 
Nonetheless, there remains to be some doubts in the sustainability of CER when it 
is pitted against the market. The main obligation of a firm is to increase profits; it is not 
an expert in environmental protection. Hence, the general consensus is that leaving the 
environmental responsibility solely to the private sector would result in market failure 
such as pollution if corporate profits start to shrink by reason of fluctuating economic 
conditions, so government intervention in setting regulations is necessary to prevent such 
failure (Croson & Treich, 2014). 
Another concern is that CER may not be sustainable if a moderately competitive 
market becomes fierce, then a firm may relax its environmental practices over time to 
remain economically competitive, though it is possible that the firm may do the opposite 
and ramp up its CER actions to gain an upper hand on the competition or reduce financial 
risks, so there are strong uncertainties (Croson & Treich, 2014; Sheikh, 2019). If the 
market becomes less competitive, a firm may also lessen its environmental commitments, 





These are all important considerations for policymakers because, even though 
they cannot predict market trends, to encourage businesses to apply CER sustainably, 
they should recognize which industries might be more likely to do so than others, and, 
within those industries, understand what might make the firms tick, so the policies could 
be tailored accordingly. This vindicates the relativist ontological approach of this 
research as the policymakers’ comprehension of these factors would ultimately shape 
how social comparison might be applied in policy. 
In summary, based on the existing literature, the normative behavior in the 
industry, the prevailing political climate, a firm’s social power, and the level of market 
power are fundamental elements in the decision making behind CER. One should take 
note that all these elements are external influences: competition, politics, society, and 
consumers. In other words, corporate governance can be molded by the behaviors or 
views of outside communities. This is where social comparison has the potential of being 
an effective policy tool. 
Institutional Isomorphism 
Since the genesis of the theory, social comparison has been well established in 
literature pertaining to individual behavioral economics, but scholars have long 
discovered that the phenomenon exists in the corporate world as well. The neo-
institutional theory studies the patterns of organizational response to institutional 
changes, and stipulates that institutional environment strongly influences organizational 
elements such as structures and practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 




is proselytized by the social embeddedness of the economy. This creates institutional 
isomorphism, a process of structural homogeneity that molds organizations within an area 
of institutional life to become more similar to one another in order to cope with a 
common set of environmental circumstances (Shepard et al., 1997). In the context of 
CER, this process would allow firms to model after one another on environmentally 
responsible practices, so firms would become more homogenous in the area of 
environmental governance. 
One does not need to go far back in history to look for an example of institutional 
isomorphism. In November 2019, Apple announced that it would invest $2.5 billion to 
help alleviate the housing crisis in Silicon Valley, following the footsteps of Google, 
which announced in July it would spend $1 billion on affordable housing in the Bay 
Area, and Facebook, which made the same $1 billion pledge in October (Elias, 2019). 
The Apple announcement surprised many in the tech industry because the firm had long 
been noncommittal to its surrounding communities (Elias, 2019). Apple executives would 
not openly admit that they made the investment to imitate or outdo Google and Facebook, 
but the timing of their announcement imparts the impression of institutional 
isomorphism. 
But why would firms do that? What is the purpose of being similar to, or even 
copying, others? Some researchers have asserted that institutional isomorphism is neither 
a form of competition nor a requirement of efficiency, but an organizational pursuit of 
legitimacy (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). This legitimacy is associated with constituents, 




view further supports the normative behavior, political power, and market conditions 
discussed earlier in this chapter when it comes to the factors impacting CER decisions. 
Particularly, this resonates with the social power equation that firms have a social 
contract with the society to be good corporate citizens, so if they fail to act responsibly, 
other firms will take over the space. Therefore, the legitimacy has relevance in both 
institutional and social aspects. 
In later research, scholars have connected corporate social comparison to business 
competition. Kim and Tsai (2012) scrutinized the application of social comparison theory 
among competing firms, which the authors called “competitive comparison”, from a 
product market perspective (Kim & Tsai, 2012). They argued that although consumers 
generally play a pertinent role in dictating the strategic course of a firm, a focal firm may 
also position itself against a target firm that is not normally seen as its direct competitor 
by consumers, called “self-asserted comparison” (Kim & Tsai, 2012). Conversely, the 
focal firm may dismiss its position against another firm that is normally perceived by 
consumers as its direct competitor, called “self-dismissed comparison” (Kim & Tsai, 
2012). The authors used an example of self-asserted comparison to illustrate their point. 
Hyundai had not historically been viewed as a competitor to BMW. In 1998, 
Hyundai management decided to assert the firm into that position by enhancing its 
research and development, investing in improved design and technology, and undertaking 
strategic marketing campaigns to compare itself to BMW (Kim & Tsai, 2012). Over time, 
it gradually became a recognized competitor to BMW and other premium automotive 




dynamics could have a positive impact on the focal firm’s business if it is competing 
upwardly with a more reputable target firm, so a competitor can surely be a benefit 
instead of a threat (Kim & Tsai, 2012). From this point of view, social comparison has a 
discernible competitive connotation, but one might advocate that ultimately firms are 
competing to attain legitimacy. Hyundai targeted the luxury market to compete, so the 
firm must align itself with other luxury brands to be legitimate. Competition and 
legitimacy go hand in hand in business; one does not exist without the other. 
This adds a new perspective to the social comparison theory. When used on 
individuals, social comparison aims to manipulate the human propensity to belong and 
affiliate (Festinger, 1954). In the case of industries, firms typically work to eliminate or 
diminish their competitors, but it appears that they also want to use their perceived rivals 
to enhance their own reputations. Thus, a firm’s social reputation should have similar 
effects on its organizational strategy as the effects of an individual’s social reputation 
would have on their decision making. In any case, Kim and Tsai (2012) looked at 
corporate social comparison only through the financial lens, but it has been made evident 
in this literature review that environmental protection does not have a distinct economic 
market or clear monetary value. 
Despite the lack of tangible justification, Shogren (2012) cited evidence showing 
that people are verily concerned with unobservable payoffs such as reputation and are 
willing to sacrifice personal wealth to buy such a reputation. This reverberates with our 
concept of CER, because, as Bénabou and Tirole (2010) propounded, corporate pro-




how the behavior reflects the management’s own desire to engage in philanthropy. This 
brings us back to institutional isomorphism, which could be a central factor in kindling 
that desire. 
Elements of Institutional Isomorphism 
In recent studies, researchers have contended that there are three elements of 
institutional isomorphism: coercive, normative, and mimetic. Coercive isomorphism 
results from direct or indirect pressures of other organizations that a firm is dependent on, 
including applicable laws and regulations, and cultural expectations of society (Liu et al., 
2018; Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). The CER incited by this process is 
defensive and reactive in nature, as lawmakers and organizational resource providers are 
forcing the changes to minimize business irresponsibility (Roszkowska-Menkesa & 
Aluchna, 2017). In this case, firms are undertaking responsible practices to avoid 
penalties, lawsuits, decrease in sales, and consumer boycotts, and these activities are 
often ad hoc and not related to core business strategy (Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 
2017). The coercive nature somewhat aligns with our discovery that corporate 
responsibility is about responding to a claim, and there have been many instances when 
firms are legally forced to be socially responsible. 
One example of coercive isomorphism can be taken from the aftermath of the 
Volkswagen emission test cheating scandal. As part of the settlement with federal 
regulators, the firm must invest $2 billion over 10 years to develop a nationwide network 
of charging stations accessible to all brands of electric vehicles in the United States 




they have violated regulations, and it could be seen as a more productive measure than 
pecuniary penalties, but it does not agree with our definition of CER as it should be a 
voluntary and proactive undertaking. 
Normative isomorphism has more voluntary implications than coercive processes. 
It has roots in professionalization and driven by education and interactions within 
professional networks, so firms may become more conducive to changes (Liu et al., 2018; 
Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). This mechanism comes from standardization 
within industries, shaping organizational culture and shared value (Roszkowska-Menkesa 
& Aluchna, 2017). For instance, one key shared value in the tech industry is innovation to 
meet society’s needs, so tech firms, regardless of size, are inclined to embed a social 
purpose of some sort into their business models (Pfitzer et al., 2013). On this account, 
advanced industries might generally be more socially progressive than other traditional 
sectors, so one might expect normative isomorphism at work in the advanced industries 
when it comes to CER matters. 
There are some similarities and differences between normative and coercive 
isomorphisms. Unlike the coercive processes, normative pressures can induce systemic 
changes that are integrated into core business strategy, so they are more sustainable than 
the coerced undertakings (Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). Like coercive 
isomorphism, there can also be charitable and altruistic actions stemming from normative 
processes, so there are some proactive characteristics in the ensuing CER initiatives 
(Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). This type of isomorphism bears some 




the factors effecting CER decisions: both normative isomorphism and behavior are 
influenced by industry norms and values. 
The third element is mimetic isomorphism. It refers to a firm’s intentional or 
unintentional modeling of other peer organizations that are more legitimate or successful 
(Liu et al., 2018; Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). On conditions of uncertainty 
in growing stakeholder expectations, resource scarcity, and accelerating globalization, 
firms purposely mimic successful peers to stay relevant by adopting similar socially 
responsible practices that would answer social pressure or maximize shareholder value 
(Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). The Apple investment on affordable housing 
discussed above could be an example of mimetic isomorphism, in which the firm might 
have intentionally imitated its competitors in helping to alleviate the housing crisis. There 
might be some presence of normative isomorphic elements as well because, as mentioned 
earlier, the tech industry has the shared value of innovation to meet society’s needs. 
Note that the mimicking efforts could also be unintentional. This could be due to 
the influence of consultants or employees hired from other firms (Roszkowska-Menkesa 
& Aluchna, 2017). This distinguishes mimetic isomorphism from coercive and normative 
isomorphisms and insinuates that there could be some type of nudge involved in mimetic 
processes, justifying our investigation into the prospective use of social comparison 
policy. The modes of CER in this situation are promotional and strategic, so they might 
or might not be related to core business strategy (Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 




and political motivations that influence CER decisions discussed earlier. This makes 
mimetic isomorphism more aligned with our research than the other two processes. 
All three isomorphic elements could certainly lead to firms becoming more 
environmentally responsible, but the pressures do not have the same strengths. From their 
quantitative research with Chinese firms, Liu et al. (2018) found that in the adoption of 
low carbon development, the respondents felt the strongest pressures from competitors 
due to the market-oriented economy, then the governmental coercive pressures were 
weaker caused by an absent carbon management policy framework, whereas the 
normative pressures were the weakest because of the collective struggles by the 
professionals to define standards. 
These findings were obviously dependent on the context where the research was 
conducted, but they nevertheless help solidify the contention that market power has a 
salient influence on CER decisions (Meng et al., 2016). In Ontario, the environmental 
policy framework is strongly instituted and the professionalization in industries is robust, 
so social comparison as a nudging policy application in this dissertation will focus on 
mimetic isomorphism and, to a lesser extent, normative isomorphism. The rationalities 
and factors influencing CER decisions provide some additional insight into the 
phenomena. 
Among the elements of normative behavior, social power, and market conditions, 
the presence of bounded, unbounded, and erotetic rationalities is conspicuous. Market 
economics would play a key part in bounded rationality because revenue and profitability 




is on the right track. Normative behavior and social power would fall under the category 
of unbounded rationality, because the connectedness with other organizations and the 
society respectively, could steer the corporate path. As a result, it could be said that there 
are some correlations among external influence, behavioral economics, and corporate 
behavior. The combination of the three elements could effectuate erotetic rationality, 
encouraging firms to act by probing for knowledge to mitigate complacency. 
Environmental Reputation of Firms 
The current literature imparts further insight into the significance of 
environmental reputation in the private sector. Although firms do not generally 
experience the deprivation that drives individuals to make behavioral changes, scholars 
have for decades maintained that corporations care greatly about their environmental 
reputation in the eyes of their customers (McGuire et al., 1988; Herremans et al., 1993). 
Such reputation is often ranked and posted publicly, such as the annual CSR ranking by 
Forbes (Valet, 2019). But why would a firm care about its environmental reputation? 
Because the primary concern of a business is to make money, the environmental 
reputation should logically be linked to profits and earnings in some ways and to some 
extent. Hussainey and Salama (2010) studied the correlation between CER and a firm’s 
earnings, and they concluded that stronger reputation in environmental affairs is 
associated with a firm’s increased ability to predict future profits, which would give 
investors stronger confidence in the firm’s stock. 
There is also empirical evidence that CER raises the reputation of the firm and 




2015). The reduction of environmental costs also gives great advantages to a firm in the 
long run, enhancing its ability to hire more qualified staff, reduce capital costs, improve 
production competitiveness and efficiency, and increase its opportunities to profit (Jo et 
al., 2015). Consequently, some firms begin undertaking CER to enhance operational 
efficiency and improve their brand image, which is conceptualized as perception or 
esteem that stakeholders hold on the organization, resulting in value creation that is 
designed to generate subsequent economic benefits, especially if the CER is highly 
visible (Khojastehpour & Johns, 2014). 
These articles have denoted the synthesis that if a firm decides to integrate CER 
into its business, it would not do so in secret, because that would have no impact on its 
value. On the contrary, the firm would want its CER practices to be as public as possible, 
so that it could appear to be socially responsible, raising its profile and value. The firm 
would want to instill an image that profits are not its only goal, but also the well-being of 
society. This would help enhance the firm’s reputation in the eyes of the consumers by 
relating itself to the human moral agency, even though the firm is not a moral agent itself. 
Subsequently, there has been a dramatic shift in corporate attitude towards CER 
in recent years. The failure to be a good corporate citizen can have devastating effects on 
a firm’s deliverables to stakeholders, and negatively impact the firm’s financial bottom 
line (Khojastehpour & Johns, 2014). Nonetheless, some firms remain reluctant in 
undertaking CER thanks to their economic priorities and the market power being too 
strong or too weak (Croson & Treich, 2014; Meng et al., 2016). Hence, industry 




nudges to influence firms to take environmental actions. It could reduce the need for 
monetary policy tools such as tax breaks, which are often used by public administrators 
to alter corporate behavior, but not always politically popular on grounds of the public 
perception of corporate welfare or handouts. 
The case for or against corporate social comparison thus comes down to how it 
might work in a policy context. The current literature has revealed that isomorphic 
pressures caused by corporate social comparison are common in environmental 
governance, and social comparison is employed in environmental policy to nudge 
individual behavior, but there is notably limited research on the application of social 
comparison as an environmental policy tool on the private sector. The research question 
in Chapter 1 presented an opportunity for the dissertation to hopefully expand the 
existing social comparison theoretical foundation into a new policy application, one that 
might feed off on the competitive nature of firms, as well as affiliation and legitimacy, in 
the realm of environmental performance. This substantiated the constructivist 
epistemological approach as the policy advisors’ perceptions helped build on the current 
knowledge, but these perceptions should involve an examination of the pros and cons to 
ascertain the prospective policy tool’s practicality. 
Benefits and Shortfalls of Corporate Social Comparison Policy 
Before corporate social comparison could be implemented in policy, it is crucial 
to consider its potential benefits and shortfalls, so policymakers could determine the 




The first possible advantage of using social comparison as policy tool to nudge 
CER is achieving industry-wide practices. While firms are legally bound to comply with 
the law, it does not equate to sustainability because compliance is only a small part of 
sustainable development (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2013). 
Because CER goes beyond mere compliance and into progressiveness, it would push a 
firm towards sustainability. With social comparison, all selected firms might be 
consistently ranked and posted based on performance, so firms could see the emission 
data of one another and might be nudged to improve accordingly. The resulting effects 
could then be industry-wide and might help enhance, or at least maintain, that 
sustainability. 
Secondly, social comparison might allow the administration to undertake 
regulatory pluralism. It is defined as the combination of the command-and-control 
regulations and voluntary industrial arrangements (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999). In our 
context, this means the government and the private sector would be working together to 
achieve sustainability. The industries would compete with one another on the 
advancement of environmental technology, while the regulatory body would safeguard 
the fairness of social comparison. The integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches 
might be more effective than the purely top-down style because businesses might own up 
to their end of responsibility, allowing the administration to dial back its on-site 





One must remember though that even if social comparison was highly effective, 
complete self-regulation should never be undertaken. Full self-regulatory approach can 
lead to market failure in environmental affairs (Croson & Treich, 2014). A consistent 
level of minimum government supervision should always be required to ensure that social 
comparison, or behavioral economics in general, is working the way it is intended. 
Regardless, some researchers have attempted to make a case for total self-
regulation in CER. Alavi et al. (2016) submitted that private international regulations 
could be used to monitor and certify environmental standards, such as contractual 
agreement among stockholders, professional community, and multi-stakeholder model 
that includes industry players, consumer representatives, and nongovernmental 
organizations, completely eliminating the involvement of state legislation. Namely, 
raising the normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures among industries and 
disconnecting coercive pressures could be the ticket to sustainability. 
In spite of their ardent support, the authors conceded that environmental 
violations and the lack of legitimacy are some of the main disadvantages of their proposal 
(Alavi et al., 2016). The protection of certain interests such as assets could render self-
regulation ineffective, so there is some level of conflict between a firm’s environmental 
responsibilities and its economic interests (Alavi et al., 2016). Indeed, the capitalistic 
nature of the private sector ensures that firms only look out for themselves for economic 
survival, so environmental matters would most likely be left behind if the government 




Such scenario defends why some scholars have insisted that public agencies must 
always be involved in environmental protection. O’Faircheallaigh (2015) professed that 
the calls to move away from public regulations and towards voluntary industry initiatives 
have inherent problems such as the lack of industry reliability, and the absence of 
industry governance capacities to implement the initiatives effectively. Goodland (2012) 
concurred with this notion, averring that self-regulation is not enough, but that 
government involvement is also required as a partnership to advance sustainable practices 
(Goodland, 2012). Moreover, the effectiveness of any behavioral economics policy 
application is not 100%, as it has been proven in individual behavior (Ouvrard & Spaeter, 
2015). The literature is synchronous in the view that with the complex corporate 
dynamics, the fickleness of business practices, and the public welfare being at stake, 
some level of government intervention is categorically vital in environmental protection. 
With an effectiveness that is less than perfect, it inevitably brings about some 
potential shortfalls in a prospective social comparison policy application. There are two 
main issues. Firstly, corporate social comparison, as it has been dissected in this chapter, 
is highly dependent on market and business, so the inconsistent effectiveness could be of 
concern. 
Because CER is voluntary, the decisions behind it rely inordinately on the 
existing management, its business beliefs, and market situations. A change in firm 
ownership, shifting economic conditions, and changing priorities of the executives, could 
lead to the abandonment of CER (Goodland, 2012). Any existing CER program in place 




advantage, and other firms might follow suit to remain competitive (Croson & Treich, 
2014). In those cases, social comparison might no longer work and the target firms, or 
even the entire industry, might ignore the policy altogether. 
As social comparison is noncoercive, its aim is to encourage firms to do more 
than their basic legal obligations. Firms should not face negative consequences if they 
decide to abandon their CER practices and fall behind their competitors, so there is not 
much the government could do if the firms do not respond to the policy (Ouvrard & 
Spaeter, 2015). Even if corporate environmental governance does not improve from 
social comparison, the government must continue to monitor and enforce to ensure the 
minimum regulatory requirements are still met, and the firms are not relaxing their basic 
environmental responsibilities to unacceptable levels. 
Another potential shortfall is the emergence of anticompetitive practices. There 
are several types of this behavior. In market terms, such practices may come in the form 
of limit pricing, in which firms manipulate market power and set prices that are 
unachievable for new firms in order to discourage them from entering the market 
(Benchekroun & Chaudhuri, 2011). In environmental terms, anticompetitive practices 
may occur if the competition for lower emissions becomes so intense that firms may 
collude to stop competing with one another if they are spending too much financial 
means on environmental technologies and programs (Benchekroun & Chaudhuri, 2011). 
Anticompetitive practices are under-the-table agreements and illegal in many countries, 
with the United States and European Union having stiff antitrust legislation that deters 




By publicly posting emission data in a prospective social comparison policy, the 
induced competition might become fierce for the target firms, potentially giving rise to a 
form of anticompetitive behavior. The top-ranking firms might set performance standards 
high enough that the lower-ranking firms could not achieve, so the former would 
constantly have an unfair advantage and always remain favorable in the eyes of the public 
and administrators. These unintended consequences are conceivable and probable 
because strict environmental policies have been linked to anticompetitive practices, 
causing firms to join or leave a coalition on the account of taxation versus incentives 
(Benchekroun & Chaudhuri, 2011). For instance, German carmakers faced inquiry from 
authorities when the firms were suspected of collusion to not compete on antipollution 
systems for diesel and petrol engines due to the strict emission standards (Boffey, 2018). 
Such connivance is unlawful because it takes the choice away from consumers, but there 
is another implication in the context of this study. 
If this happened with the proposed application, it could reduce or null the 
effectiveness of social comparison policy because it might essentially eliminate 
competition if the government was simply applying the policy to all firms within an 
industry without analyzing their respective capabilities. This echoes with the original 
social comparison theory that individuals develop tendencies to evaluate themselves 
when compared to those that are somewhat different from them, but not under very 
divergent conditions (Festinger, 1954). Comparing large and small corporate players 




would be ineffectual and pointless to attempt to nudge the smaller firms by showing them 
unattainable data from the larger firms. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The historical and recent literature has provided valuable insight into this 
proposed research on several fronts. The elements that affect CER decision making have 
been explored for their external influences, that firms could also be subjected to coercive, 
normative, and mimetic isomorphisms, and bounded, unbounded, and erotetic 
rationalities. Unbounded rationality could particularly engender nonmarket valuation, 
which opens a willingness gap that results in divergent environmental practices among 
firms, so social comparison could potentially be a useful policy tool to close that gap and 
help achieve sustainability by nudging the selected firms to be more environmentally 
responsible. 
Factors such as brand image, industry reputation, operational efficiency, and 
public perception are linked to financial growth, so firms might reevaluate their 
environmental practices, and social comparison might help sustain that reevaluation 
thanks to the dynamics of competition and legitimacy. This could be carried out by 
understanding the market conditions, industry characteristics, and firm capabilities, so the 
businesses selected for nudging would be suitable for the policy. It could also help 
achieve industry-wide practices and regulatory pluralism, so there are apparent benefits to 
the private sector and the government. Inconsistent effectiveness and anticompetitive 
practices remind policymakers to research carefully which firms to be compared and be 




After examining the theoretical and conceptual aspects to identify the research 
gaps, the next step is to present the methodology that was used to collect data to 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of MECP 
policy advisors on the usefulness of social comparison in air emissions policy to 
encourage CER practices. The data were generated through in-depth semistructured 
interviews with the advisors to understand their perceptions on the application of the 
social comparison theory, behavioral economics, CER, mimetic isomorphism, and 
normative isomorphism in air emissions policy. The ontology of the research was 
relativist due to the individual perceptions of the advisors, and the epistemology was 
constructivist for the assembly of views from the participants. The findings are outlined 
in Chapters 4 and 5 to add to discussions of how applicable and effective a social 
comparison policy might be in promoting ubiquitous CER practices in the private sector. 
This chapter is organized as follows: The rationale for the qualitative approach 
and my role as the researcher are presented. The methodology is then introduced, 
including the logic of participant selection, instrumentation, procedures for recruitment, 
participation, data collection, and the plan for data analysis. Finally, the issues of 
trustworthiness are discussed. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The research question for the study was: What are the perceptions of MECP 
policy advisors on the applicability of social comparison in air emission standards to 
nudge for-profit firms to practice CER? The central concepts under study were 




homogeneity that molds organizations within an area of institutional life to become more 
similar to one another so as to cope with a common set of environmental circumstances 
and to compete for institutional legitimacy in terms of social and economic prowess for 
customers and resources as well as political power (Shepard et al., 1997). In this study, 
CER was defined as a form of corporate governance in which a firm surpasses its legal 
responsibilities, voluntarily and proactively, to protect the natural environment in a 
sustainable manner (European Commission, 2011; Global Affairs Canada, 2019; World 
Bank, n.d.). 
The research tradition was generic qualitative inquiry. This tradition employs 
qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviewing, to answer straightforward questions 
(Patton, 2015). This approach has roots in pragmatism and directs the researcher to seek 
useful and practical answers that can address concrete problems (Patton, 2015). The 
tradition aligned well with the qualitative research because I aimed to explore the 
perceptions of policy advisors on the applicability of a specific policy tool. I wanted to 
know their thoughts on how applicable social comparison might be in nudging firms to be 
more environmentally responsible, so I searched for their collective and subjective truth 
regarding a potential policy application. 
Role of the Researcher 
I was the designer of the study and interview protocol, which means it was my 
responsibility to set the boundaries and characteristics of the interviews and ensure that I 
adhered to the protocol to safeguard the integrity of the data. The interview protocol 




comparison was the primary theoretical foundation for the study, with behavioral 
economics and CER as the primary conceptual framework. Mimetic and normative 
isomorphisms were two supplemental concepts to the primary framework. The interview 
questions were constructed based on these elements. 
In the first question, the interviewee and I discussed CER in general and firms 
that voluntarily change their business models to be more environmentally proactive. The 
follow-up question was related to behavioral economics on why firms behave in such 
ways, including the five factors that influence CER decisions discussed in Chapter 2: (a) 
moral agency, (b) normative behavior, (c) political motivations, (d) social power, and (e) 
market considerations. In the second and third questions, we delved into the isomorphic 
pressures to discuss the imitation of the business models of more successful peers. The 
final interview question was about the use of social comparison in the air emissions 
policy context, directly answering the research question about the advisors’ perceptions 
on policy applicability. 
My role as the researcher was also to be an observer in the data collection process. 
A researcher must focus on the participants during the interviews, write descriptively, 
record field notes to acquire discipline and expertise, separate details from trivia, 
triangulate and validate the data systematically, and report strengths and weaknesses of 
the researcher’s perspectives (Patton, 2015). As an observer, I listened to the participants’ 
responses carefully and was attentive to their demeanor, whenever they chose to appear 




To record each interview with accuracy, I used an online transcription tool to 
conduct live transcriptions and took handwritten notes during the answers to retain a 
strong impression about the interview and ask follow-up questions to encourage 
expansion on answers. Soon after each interview, I jotted down field notes to document 
my thoughts, which allowed me to reflect and meditate on the experience. In my research 
journal, I also recorded any feelings of my own bias during the interviews, which helped 
me become more cognizant of my own body language and tone of voice that might have 
influenced the answers given by the participants. 
Although I am an MECP employee, I did not have any personal or professional 
relationships with the policy advisor participants. Being familiar with the organizational 
structure of MECP, I was able to select the prospective participants from three separate 
disciplines: air policy, climate change policy, and environmental economics. There were 
no power relationships or differentials with the interviewees, and researcher bias was 
deemed minimal. My role in MECP is not related to air emissions policy or behavioral 
economics, so there was no conflict of interest in the study. From my perspective, 
regardless of whether the policy advisors were in favor, against, indifferent, or divided 
regarding the use of social comparison as a policy tool to nudge corporate environmental 
behavior, I saw the research as an opportunity to potentially expand on existing 
knowledge. Hence, there was little researcher bias during the design of the study. I also 
do not work with any of the policy teams involved in the study, so I did not conduct 





To determine participant eligibility, I first searched for the names of all policy 
advisors who worked in air policy, climate change policy, and environmental economics 
in the MECP staff directory. All Ontario government employee names and contact details 
are a matter of public record, so I did not need permission to obtain their work 
information. Participants did not need permission to talk with me because I am not part of 
the news media. Reporters and journalists are the only people who must go through the 
Communications Branch in each ministry before speaking with Ontario government 
employees. Otherwise, the general public has direct access to public servants. 
Next, I reached out to each identified advisor by email to introduce myself and the 
purpose of my research, with a note indicating that I would be calling them in 5 business 
days for a follow-up if necessary (Appendix A). A follow-up call was necessary for 
approximately half of the advisors I initially emailed, and in the calls, I explained further 
what the study entailed and answered any questions they had. When the responses were 
positive, I sought their participation in the interview process. I also sent them the consent 
form along with the sample interview questions in advance so they could think about 
whether to participate. 
There were 23 policy advisors in total across the three aforementioned disciplines 
in MECP, and I contacted all of them. For a purposeful sampling strategy, Patton (2015) 
recommended that sample size be a multiple of 10. For that reason, my targeted number 
of participants was 10; familiarity with air emission standards was paramount to my 




Nevertheless, the interview questions were straightforward, so 10 participants would have 
been adequate in reaching saturation. Initially, 11 policy advisors agreed to participate, 
but two declined later, so the final number of participants was nine. 
Two main data collection instruments were used, including an interview protocol, 
and a notebook in which I recorded my thoughts and reflections. I produced all these 
instruments myself, and they were sufficient in answering the research question. The in-
depth, semistructured interviews were established by the protocol, which included four 
main interview questions and predetermined follow-up questions (Appendix B). The 
interview protocol was developed based on the research question and the theoretical and 
conceptual framework. The notebook allowed me to be mindful of interesting points 
during the interviews, so I could encourage the participants to further elaborate on their 
answers. The interviews were recorded using an online transcription tool, which recorded 
and transcribed the interviews simultaneously. I subsequently compared the transcripts 
with the audio data to confirm accuracy. 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I decided to collect the data by interviews using 
an internet-based video conferencing system. Four of the nine interviewees opted not to 
appear on camera. I personally collected the data and interviewed each policy advisor 
once. Each interview lasted about 60 minutes and were recorded by the online 
transcription tool and written notes. For debriefing and member checking, I first asked 
the participants if they wanted to add anything at the end of the interviews. I then sent the 
transcripts to the participants for any changes they might wish to make. I gave them three 




The research question called for the perceptions of policy advisors, so in-depth 
interviewing was the best tool to collect the required data. I used manual coding for data 
analysis due to my intimate familiarity with the interviews. In terms of discrepant data, 
these are defined as cases that do not fit a particular pattern or the current understanding 
of the data (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). As the sampling strategy was purposeful and the 
participants were carefully selected, there were no discrepant cases. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Because I received relatively straightforward answers, I used attribute and 
structural coding techniques in the first cycle of data analysis to manage and obtain an 
overview of the data. Attribute coding was my first step of analysis, which logged 
essential information about the data and demographic characteristics of the participants 
for future management and reference (Saldaña, 2016). For this study, I included the 
descriptive information about each interviewee’s policy discipline, interview setting, 
location, time, and date. 
My next step was structural coding. This coding technique is a labeling and 
indexing device that allows researchers to access data that are relevant to the study and 
search for commonalties, differences, and relationships (Saldaña, 2016). The preliminary 
structural coding framework that I constructed based on the research question is as 
follows: 
• Firms that proactively reduce their emissions: This code isolated the discussions 




• Firms that imitate others in environmental proactivity: This code identified 
discussions of firms that copy or mimic other firms’ proactivity in environmental 
governance. 
• Policy to encourage firm imitation in environmental proactivity: This code 
pinpointed the discussions of ways that policy might be used to encourage such 
imitation in the private sector. 
The initial parent codes, child codes, and the corresponding interview questions, 
based on Saldaña (2016), are found in Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
Initial Coding Framework 
Parent code Child code Interview question 








1, 1 (a) 
Institutional isomorphism Mimetic isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism 
2, 3, 3 (a) 
Social comparison policy Social comparison 4, 4 (a) 
 
After separating the data into different categories, I undertook pattern coding in 
the second cycle of analysis. Pattern codes are explanatory or inferential codes that 
identify an emergent theme, configuration, or explanation (Saldaña, 2016). I identified 
patterns in phrases, terms, and words to determine what the policy advisors were 




imitation in the corporate world. My interpretations played a role in the coding process, 
so I will report how the analysis was affected by those expositions in Chapter 5. 
The sampling strategy of the population was purposeful as I specifically looked 
for policy advisors who were familiar with air emission standards. The selected 
participants were thus rich in information and able to illuminate the research question 
(Patton, 2015). Behavioral economics or nudging in general is not a new policy tool in 
environmental governance, but the context of corporate social comparison is, so it was 
beneficial for the participants to know a bit about the subject of behavioral economics, 
though not necessary for the study. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
In qualitative research, thanks to the nature of purposeful sampling, the issue of 
trustworthiness has often come up. In this section of the chapter, credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study are evaluated. 
Credibility is also known as internal validity. It refers to the researcher’s ability to 
consider all the complexities in a study and deal with patterns that are not easily 
explained (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). To establish credibility, the researcher must structure a 
study in a manner that addresses complexity throughout the research design, including 
triangulation, member checking, discussion of negative cases, reflexivity, saturation, and 
peer review (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). In this dissertation, the data sources were policy 
advisors from three separate policy disciplines: air emissions, climate change, and 




disciplines were under different MECP divisions, so triangulation was achieved by 
obtaining data from multiple sources. 
Because there was no conflict of interest on my end, and I did not gain from either 
positive or negative responses from the participants, I could freely and openly discuss any 
negative cases with my committee and in the dissertation to enrich the study. Journaling 
enabled me to reflect on the process as well, and because the research context was rather 
focused, saturation was reached after nine samples. By means of these strategies, 
credibility was achieved in the study. 
Transferability, or external validity, is another important criterion of 
trustworthiness. It calls attention to the ability of the qualitative study to be applicable or 
transferable to broader contexts (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). In this study, the interview 
questions did not focus only on the province of Ontario, but the generic views on how 
effective social comparison might be to nudge for-profit firms to be more 
environmentally responsible. 
Because CER is a form of CSR, the data could potentially be applicable in other 
aspects of social policy, such as labor practices in pay equity and workplace health and 
safety. An element that helps establish transferability is thick description, which denotes 
great details about the research setting to enhance the depth of contextual specifics 
(Ravitch & Carl, 2016). The thick description was important in this study because the 
research problem and research question were highly contextual, so the thick description 




The COVID-19 pandemic has forced all nonessential Ontario government 
employees to work remotely, and with social distancing expected to be in effect in the 
near future, the virtual platform interviews allowed the policy advisors to express their 
views from the comfort of the locations of their choice. The thick description of these 
interviewing environments along with my thoughts and additional participant input 
should greatly improve the transferability of the study. 
The question of dependability must be addressed in the research as well. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, one of the potential disadvantages of applying corporate social 
comparison to environmental policy is its inconsistent effectiveness in nudging firms to 
maintain their levels of CER commitment. It was not surprising that the interview data 
reflected this inconsistency as the advisors saw the policy applicability from economic 
and/or environmental perspectives, producing greatly diverse views. Therefore, 
triangulation from three different policy disciplines, including air emissions, climate 
change, and environmental economics, was key in establishing dependability in the data. 
The confirmability in the study pertains to the subjectivity of the researcher. The 
interpretations and analysis of the data could be subjected to researcher bias, so 
confirmability aims to achieve neutrality as much as possible through triangulation and 
reflexivity (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Triangulation was achieved by having multiple data 
sources, and debriefing and member checking were completed through transcript review 





I am a Senior Noise Engineer in MECP, so I specialize in noise pollution and I 
administer existing regulations and guidelines to ensure compliance. I do not work with 
air emissions, behavioral economics, or policy analysis, and I am not associated with any 
policy advisors in my job. Prior to the study, I did not personally know any policy advisor 
in MECP. All the prospective participants were in divisions that are separate from mine, 
and I did not professionally benefit from any type of response from the participants. In 
other words, my interviewees and I were complete strangers before this study. I am 
deeply passionate about my research, regardless of the outcome of the analysis. 
The ethical considerations are elemental to the integrity of any research study. 
The institutional agreements that I needed to gain access to the prospective participants 
included the Institutional Review Board (IRB). These agreements were necessary to 
ensure proper treatment of human participants. I completed the required IRB documents 
and ironed out all ethical concerns before the IRB approved my data collection. The 
approval number was 07-31-20-1010086. 
The main ethical concern during the recruitment process was the privacy of the 
interviewees. Although the policy advisors’ names and contact information were 
available to the public, they did not necessarily want to be known that they participated in 
the study. To ensure confidentiality, I sent individual emails instead of mass emails to 
invite them. When I called some of them on the telephone to follow up, I ensured that it 
was appropriate for us to speak privately. When it comes to data collection, the interview 




comparison in public policy, so there were no other major ethical concerns as these were 
not sensitive topics. 
When it comes to data confidentiality, the transcripts, recordings, notes, coding 
results, and analysis are all stored in a password-protected folder in a flash drive that is 
not connected to the internet. I am the only person who has direct access to the data, 
which will be destroyed after 5 years of storage. The participants were named P1, P2, P3, 
and so forth, to ensure complete anonymity. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented all aspects of the research methodology. By using 
a generic qualitative inquiry that employed attribute, structural, and pattern coding 
techniques, the study pursued a pragmatic approach that aligned with its purpose, seeking 
the perceptions of MECP policy advisors regarding a potential policy tool. Moreover, the 
purposeful sampling strategy enabled richness in the data and answered the research 
question to its fullest extent. As an observer and designer of the interview protocol, I 
listened to the participants actively and attentively, encouraged expansion of answers, 
and was aware of the strengths and limitations of my personal interpretations. The 
interview protocol, online transcription tool, written notes, and journaling promoted those 
efforts. 
In the issue of trustworthiness, I have also addressed credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability of the study, with triangulation using multiple data 
sources, member checking and debriefing through transcript review by the participants, 




privacy and confidentiality were of utmost importance as the policy advisors expressed 
their views on a topic related to their profession, so I have secured their identities and 
data with the greatest care. With the methodology assessed and the research plan 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research study was to explore the perceptions of MECP policy 
advisors on the practicality of applying social comparison as a policy tool to influence 
corporate environmental behavior. The data were collected through in-depth 
semistructured interviews with the advisors to understand their views on how useful it 
might be to use corporate social comparison in the air emissions policy context. The 
findings are described in this chapter and Chapter 5 to illuminate the potential usefulness 
of a social comparison policy in nudging broader CER practices in the private sector. The 
research question for the study was: What are the perceptions of MECP policy advisors 
on the applicability of social comparison in air emissions policy to nudge for-profit firms 
to practice CER? 
This chapter is organized as follows: The setting and demographics of the 
interviews are first discussed, followed by the data collection and analysis. The evidence 
of trustworthiness is then presented, with credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability scrutinized. Finally, the results are analyzed. 
Organizational Setting 
Ontario is currently governed by the conservative party, so there have been 
budget cuts across the board (Parkinson, 2018). However, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
forced the government to focus on keeping its administrators safe while continuing to 




Therefore, no strenuous personal or organizational conditions influenced the participants 
or their experience at the time of the study, and I recorded this opinion in my journaling. 
Demographics 
The following data were collected about the participants. All nine participants 
were MECP policy advisors working in climate change and environmental policy. Five 
participants specialized in climate change policy, three were from air policy, and one was 
in environmental economics. They all had various levels of policy experience, ranging 
from a few months to over 30 years, according to some participants’ unprompted self-
disclosure. I did not collect data regarding their race, age, and gender, as such 
information was irrelevant to the study. 
Data Collection 
All participants took part in the in-depth, semistructured interviews that lasted 
approximately 60 minutes each. The interviews were carried out over a 2-week period 
and all conducted via an online video conferencing system, so the participants were at 
locations of their choice. Four of the nine participants elected not to go on camera during 
interviewing, but all consented to being audio recorded. I interviewed each participant 
once, and the interviews were recorded and transcribed simultaneously using an online 
transcription tool. The transcripts were accurate when compared to the audio data. 
In Chapter 3, I had planned to recruit 10 participants for the generic qualitative 
inquiry design. Eleven advisors initially agreed to participate, but two declined later due 
to unavailability. Data collection was consistent with the plan presented in Chapter 3, and 





Data analysis involved two coding cycles that included attribute, structural, and 
pattern coding techniques. The inductive sequence of these steps allowed categories and 
dominant codes to emerge from the raw data. In the first cycle, attribute coding contained 
essential demographic information about the participants for future references (Saldaña, 
2016). I had planned to ask the number of years’ experience each participant had in 
policy, but that information could be an identifier that could have jeopardized the privacy 
of the interviewees. Instead, I asked them what they liked and what they found 
challenging about their job (Appendix B). Participants were identified as P1, P2, P3, and 
so forth, in the interviews, and their race, age, or gender were not recorded in the data; 
the only demographic attributes of the interviews were the policy disciplines the advisors 
belonged to: air emissions policy (three participants) , climate change policy (five 
participants) , and environmental economics (one participant). Policy disciplines are 
important attributes as they help achieve triangulation and might explain participant 
perceptions. 
The raw data were generated by the online transcription tool after each interview 
and were exported to a Word document. I listened to each interview recording to compare 
with the data, and I organized the information to produce a transcript. I then sent each 
transcript to each participant for review, and no additional changes were submitted. After 
finalizing each transcript, I proceeded with structural coding. 
The process of structural coding began with a preliminary coding matrix that was 




to tally the aggregate numbers of times certain codes appeared in the data. As Table 1 
shows, the first three interview questions were based on the existing literature with nine 
child codes, and the fourth interview question inquired about policy applicability in the 
literature gap with one child code. Thus, there were 10 initial codes in the preliminary 
matrix. The warm-up questions in Appendix B were related to job satisfaction in the 
policy field. 
To begin structural coding, I started looking for words, terms, phrases, sentences, 
anecdotes, and entire response to a question that were related, explicitly or implicitly, to 
the meanings of the initial codes. Whenever I recognized a match, I highlighted it with a 
unique color in the data and added to the tally count in the coding matrix. Often, multiple 
codes could be embedded in sentences, so footnotes were added in the data to expand on 
what those codes were. When new codes appeared, whether they were related to job 
satisfaction, the literature, or policy applicability, I also assigned unique colored 
highlights and added them to the coding matrix. Also, whenever a new code was created, 
I undertook an iterative process to revisit previous transcripts to ensure the code was fully 
captured in the overall data. The aggregate total for each code was then calculated to 
indicate the combined number of times the code appeared in all interviews. The coding 
matrix is an expansion of the initial framework to construct a structure for the data.  
For the purpose of presentation in this chapter, I allocated four font styles to the 
codes and split them into four matrices to better distinguish them. The regular font codes 
are from the initial framework based on the literature, the italic style codes are associated 




literature, and the italic-bold style codes are related to policy applicability. The aggregate 







Aggregate Frequency Matrices Based on Structural Coding 
 Aggregate frequency (f) 
Initial code based on literature  
Corporate environmental responsibility 20 
Behavioral economics 11 
Moral agency 10 
Normative behavior 14 
Political motivations 0 
Social power 30 
Market considerations 27 
Mimetic isomorphism 10 
Normative isomorphism 14 
Social comparison 18 
New code related to job satisfaction  
Narrow communication channels 1 
Policy innovations 4 
Policy idea exchanges 3 
Public stewardship 7 
Policy variety 1 
Politics-administration dichotomy 15 
Thoroughness of policy research 1 
New code related to literature  
Corporate culture 1 
Corporate leader decision making 2 
Tech innovations from industry leaders 3 
Eco-economic decoupling 1 
Long-term sustainability 1 
Consumer desirability 1 
Public momentum 1 
Financial incentives 27 
Bounded rationality 3 
Erotetic rationality 1 
Coercive isomorphism 17 
Weak regulations 2 
Risk management 10 
Greenwashing 5 
Environmental certifications 1 
New code related to policy applicability   
Dependability of information 4 
Accessibility of information 2 
Comparability of information 6 
Accountability of reporting 3 
Public interest 3 
Sufficiency of improvement 2 
Supplementary to regulations 3 
Policy design 8 
Policy outcomes 1 
Industry snowballing effect 1 
Corporate policy driving public policy 2 
Reward or economic policy component 2 
Corporate collaboration 1 
Public-private collaboration 2 
Apathetic reaction 1 
Defeatism 1 
Self-reporting mechanism 1 
Program support to level playing field 4 
Singling out companies 1 





In the second coding cycle, I used pattern coding to identify an emergent 
explanation from the data (Saldaña, 2016). To do so, I rearranged the coding matrices to 
separate the codes into three categories: job satisfaction, literature-related, and policy 
applicability. The codes in each category were then sorted from the largest to smallest 
aggregate numbers to draw out the dominant codes and patterns from the data. The final 








 Aggregate frequency (f) 
Code (job satisfaction)  
Politics-administration dichotomy 15 
Public stewardship 7 
Policy innovations 4 
Policy idea exchanges 3 
Narrow communication channels 1 
Policy variety 1 
Thoroughness of policy research 1 
Code (literature-related)  
Social power 30 
Market considerations 27 
Financial incentives 27 
Corporate environmental responsibility 20 
Social comparison 18 
Coercive isomorphism 17 
Normative behavior 14 
Normative isomorphism 14 
Behavioral economics 11 
Moral agency 10 
Mimetic isomorphism 10 
Risk management 10 
Greenwashing 5 
Technological innovations from industry leaders 3 
Bounded rationality 3 
Corporate leader decision making 2 
Weak regulations 2 
Corporate Culture 1 
Eco-economic decoupling 1 
Long-term sustainability 1 
Consumer desirability 1 
Public momentum 1 
Erotetic rationality 1 
Environmental certifications 1 
Political motivations 0 
Code (policy applicability)  
Policy design 8 
Comparability of information 6 
Dependability of information 4 
Program support to level the playing field 4 
Level of compliance 4 
Accountability of reporting 3 
Public interest 3 
Supplementary to regulations 3 
Accessibility of information 2 
Sufficiency of improvement 2 
Corporate policy driving public policy 2 
Reward/Economic policy component 2 
Public-private collaboration 2 
Policy outcomes 1 
Industry snowballing effects 1 
Corporate collaboration 1 
Apathetic reaction 1 
Defeatism 1 
Self-reporting mechanism 1 





Results of Analysis 
When discussing the level of job satisfaction associated with working in the 
policy field during the warm-up questions, there was a consensus among all participants 
that policy advisors are often encumbered by the absence of direction from senior 
management, their lack of decision-making ability, and the inconsistent requests within 
the organization when working on various policy projects. P5 mentioned, “There’s the 
policy advisors and there’s the decision makers, and it’s relatively rare for those things to 
come into alignment.” P3 concurred, “Every time a new government comes in, you 
know, our priorities kind of shift.” Others described the policy process as being “very 
slow” (P4) and “frustrating” (P11), and that they often had to “do a 180o and work on 
something else” (P9). These testimonies indicate that politics and administration are 
connected and cannot be mutually exclusive. Despite the hurdles, eight out of nine 
participants pointed out that they enjoyed “getting to interact with different groups” (P3), 
the “intellectual challenge of finding solutions that work” (P10), and “making people’s 
lives better” (P1). The public stewardship and innovative idea exchanges that come with 
policymaking and making an impact on the environment and society can indeed be 
immensely rewarding. 
On the literature-related subject of for-profit firms going beyond to be 
environmentally proactive, the advisors unanimously thought that societal and market 
pressures push firms to practice CER. P7 suggested, “There’s a huge social stigma or 
social consideration attached to [CER] that doesn’t necessarily have to do with 




company overall.” P4 opined that firms that have a “public face” are more conducive to 
the “idea of improving [their] environmental performance for public relations.” 
At the same time, the policy advisors universally agreed that a firm’s public 
image is intertwined with its market position. P10 underscored the “marketing leverage” 
when firms differentiate themselves and that there are “negative brand associations with 
being seen as kind of an environmental laggard”; firms could “forget about the 
economics of it” because they “don’t want to be seen as kind of the dinosaur of [the] 
industry, you know, the dirtiest player in the industry.” P8 asserted,  
To be the first one in, to be a leader in the field, gives you market advantage, 
[because] to be the 10th company to ban plastic straws, no one remembers it, so 
you will remember Starbucks if they are the first one.  
In other words, giving the public a stronger impression on its environmental governance 
would put a firm in a higher market position than its competitors or other peer 
organizations. 
Naturally, a better market standing results in healthier financial performance for 
the firm. There was a general emphasis among the policy advisors that the potential 
financial incentives associated with CER are a major factor that nudges firms to be 
proactive. The pressures could even originate internally. P1 noted, “There is going to be a 
price on carbon … shareholders might say it’s too expensive … to keep burning the dirty 
stuff in the long term.” This means shareholders could pressure management to reduce 
costs by moving toward greener alternatives. P4 went further into details that firms could 




benefit that they expect to gain from getting ahead.” For that reason, P4 believed that a 
firm would not go too far in practicing CER “if there isn’t some kind of benefit to them.” 
This contrasts with the views of P10 discussed earlier, who felt that firms would 
overlook the financial aspects to be comparable to others environmentally. In fact, this is 
the most noticeable difference in the data between the advisor with an economic 
background and the rest of the participants. The code financial incentives appeared more 
times than any other codes for P4, who also underlined the importance of financial 
considerations in CER more frequently than any of the other policy advisors. Having said 
that, this does not negate the significance of the social comparison phenomenon in the 
private sector. 
In the interviews, the advisors accorded in principle that for-profit firms need to 
keep up with the environmental trends in industries to remain relevant. Using the 
automotive sector as an example, P5 explained that if big manufacturers such as 
Volkswagen and Tesla were showcasing their latest electric vehicles in the auto show, 
and,  
You are standing there with a five-liter pickup truck, not that exciting, and you 
know all the press is circling around one group and you are being ignored. And I 
imagine there is just like a sort of a peer pressure element to it. 
P3 also felt that being the “odd one out” or “20 years behind” is not in a firm’s best 
interest. Other advisors described comparing firms as “an element of shame” (P7) or 
“earning legitimacy” (P1), so social comparison could still be an effective way in 




Does this mean applying social comparison to environmental policy might work 
in the corporate context? In tackling the question of policy applicability, the advisors had 
somewhat divided and skeptical views on the matter. The code that stands out the most is 
policy design, followed by comparability of information and dependability of 
information. In policy design, some advisors saw an opportunity to use social 
comparison, but it would strongly depend on how the policy is formulated. P11 supported 
the idea and cited Indonesia as an example, where the national government used color 
coding to show industrial firms’ regulatory compliance, with “gold” being fully 
compliant, “black” being noncompliant, and “there’s a spectrum of colors in between 
[showing] moderately complying or having some problems out there.” P11 lauded that 
the Indonesian program worked very successfully, as “in a matter of two years, 
compliance went up to 50%.” 
P7 thought it could be a useful policy as well, but it should perhaps be on a 
“sliding scale” or a “reward” program because there would be “definite winners and 
losers” in posting and ranking emissions. It would also depend in what scale the policy 
would be implemented, whether it would be nationally and/or locally. P7 further 
expounded that there should be “some sort of support from government” that would help 
firms at the lower end of the ranking to raise their environmental performance, otherwise 
it could lead to corporate apathy or defeatism and null the efficacy of the prospective 
policy. 
Other advisors recognized some small potential on the notion, but they were more 




consideration. P8 stressed that the types of emission being compared would matter as the 
level of “public interest” would play a key role in nudging firms to act. P3 agreed with 
this notion, cautioning that the “structure of the ranking and what the ranking is based 
on” could be picked apart and the policy could start to lose value. P10 alluded that “the 
devil is in the details” on how the comparison could be standardized. This is a logical 
contention because each industry has its own characteristics, so policy standardization 
could be a challenge. P5 was concerned about greenwashing as it would be “very easy to 
make a declaration,” and “good dependable information” is hard to come by. 
In addition, the comparability, accessibility, and accountability of the submitted 
information would dictate the policy outcomes. P4 was more reluctant to speculate on the 
potential efficacy, saying, “Ranking it, you know, might give some added pressure on 
these companies to do something, but I don’t know if it will be a strong, strong pressure.” 
This is because it would depend on several factors, such as the “mechanism of pressure” 
and “what kind of response are you going to get from people who will care about these 
things.” There were plenty of reservations among the majority of advisors on how 
applicable a social comparison policy might be in influencing corporate environmental 
behavior. 
One policy advisor flat out rejected the concept. P9 had a rather pragmatic 
approach to the subject and surmised that “companies may not be so thrilled to be on 
board with that” because if the firms are “in compliance and they are operating legally … 
they really have no onus to further reduce the emissions.” To this advisor, regardless of 




they are “in the business of making money.” This perception could be linked to the 
corporate apathy and economic priorities espoused by other advisors. 
An emergent code from the interviews is coercive isomorphism, which is related 
to how environmental regulations affects the practice of CER. While proactive corporate 
environmental behavior could be perceived as doing the right thing, it is not necessarily 
the case. P3 spoke candidly about firms making decisions to go above and beyond due to 
the “regulations [becoming] more stringent,” and they would do a little more so the 
government can “get off [their] backs for a few more decades.” P4 acceded that if a firm 
expects some stricter regulations will be coming down the pipe, “they probably might 
start to do things to reduce their emissions if they think they are going to be regulated.” 
P5 posited that stronger regulatory frameworks could be driving this type of behavior, so 
firms are acting proactively as a way of “managing risks,”, so they are not “caught flat 
footed when a big policy change comes through.” P7 propounded from a different angle, 
that “when it comes from the government, [it] doesn’t seem like a social pressure,” so the 
prospective policy could end up acting like a regulation, forcing firms to take certain 
actions. These assertions have further enriched the knowledge about the role of 
government in corporate environmental behavior, and the delicate balance between 
regulatory and nonregulatory policymaking. 
Another emergent code in the data is risk management, brought up by the 
participants in several contexts. In addition to the anticipation of future regulations, firms 




As emission regulations and oil demand uncertainties grow, the prospect of 
putting $5 million into an exploration project becomes much riskier, so you don't 
want to be stuck having made a big investment that gets stranded because the 
policy and the consumption environment have changed. 
P5 also viewed risk management through the commercial lens, that putting “all of your 
eggs in one basket” is unwise, because if “things really come around in 5 to 10 years, and 
you haven't invested in the technology, you are going to be left behind.” P1 ushered 
further insight into the matter, that “it would be short sighted not to think that industries 
and businesses won't be subjected to regulatory or transitional risks, or even physical 
risks, depending on where they are located.” Simply put, by being environmentally 
proactive, firms could minimize various risks that they would need to take on, so they 
could remain economically relevant for decades to come. 
All nine policy advisors contributed substantially to the research and each 
participant added new codes to the coding matrix, so there was no discrepant case in the 
study. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
To determine the trustworthiness of this research study, there are four areas that 
need to be scrutinized, including credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability. 
Credibility, also known as internal validity, deals with the complexities in a study. 
To address this, triangulation, member checking, discussion of negative cases, reflexivity, 




all three disciplines, including air policy, climate change policy, and environmental 
economics, participated in the interviews, so triangulation was achieved. Member 
checking was conducted by sending transcripts to the participants for review, and no 
additional changes were submitted. There were no negative or discrepant cases in the 
study as all participants provided rich data to add to the knowledge. To reflect on my 
experience conducting the interviews, I did not ask leading follow-up questions that 
would cause the participants to answer one way or the other, and I was completely neutral 
in my body language and tone of voice. No new code was added to the policy 
applicability category of the coding matrix after the final interview, so I believe data 
saturation was achieved in terms of filling the literature gap. Peer review was conducted 
by my dissertation committee, which contained subject matter and methodology experts. 
The credibility of the study was thus established. 
Transferability is also referred to as external validity. It delves into the 
applicability of the qualitative study in broader contexts (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). In 
Chapter 2, I discussed the political motivations behind CER practices, and in traditional 
societies, for-profit businesses are more keen to ally with the ruling parties compared to 
those in the more advanced jurisdictions (Jeong & Kim, 2020; Uddin et al., 2018). 
Although the interview questions were free of context, the policy advisors worked for a 
public agency in Ontario, Canada, so their perceptions might be more aligned with the 
western cultural and political values than traditional values. Moreover, no interviewee 
pointed out how politics might be a motivating factor for firms to undertake CER 




(Table 3). With the COVID-19 pandemic, all participants were interviewed at the 
locations of their choice, and any potential major organizational changes were suspended, 
so the transferability of the study could be to contexts that have a similar setting, where 
policy advisors are working remotely and facing uncertain organizational changes. 
Dependability was attained through triangulation as discussed above. The greatly 
diverse answers on the research question from policy advisors with air emissions, climate 
change, and environmental economics backgrounds tremendously enriched the study. On 
the other hand, debriefing and member checking through transcript review also helped 
address confirmability of the research. As a senior engineer who does not work in air 
policy, climate change policy, or environmental economics, I did not personally or 
professionally gain from the participants’ responses in any way, and I openly reported on 
all the positive, neutral, and negative cases in my data analysis, so there is evidence of 
confirmability in the research. 
Summary 
The research question explored the perceptions of MECP policy advisors on the 
possible usefulness of a social comparison policy to influence corporate environmental 
behavior. Overall, the participants were undecided on the issue because firms undertake 
CER practices for various reasons, such as societal pressures to be good corporate 
citizens, market pressures from competitors and peer organizations, financial incentives 
to be environmentally friendly, potential strict regulations in the future, risk management, 
and the need to maintain legitimacy in the industry. As a result, there are multiple policy 




that are being compared, the implemental scale of the policy, the level of public interest 
on the information, accountability and dependability of the submitted information to 
prevent greenwashing, and governmental support for firms at the bottom of the ranking to 
avoid corporate apathy and defeatism. The intricate nature of such a policy needs to be 
dissected and examined before a framework could be constructed. 
After the presentation of the analysis and results, the next step is to discuss the 
implications of the information, provide recommendations for future research, and 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the possible merit of applying social 
comparison to air emissions policy to promote CER among private sector industries in 
the province of Ontario, Canada. The research was carried out through in-depth, 
semistructured interviews with nine MECP policy advisors specializing in air policy, 
climate change policy, and environmental economics. The qualitative nature of the study 
suggested relativist ontology and constructivist epistemology as the advisors’ individual 
perceptions built a collective and subjective truth regarding the subject. The research was 
conducted because of the necessity to encourage for-profit firms to proactively engage in 
environmental protection as a result of limited government resources to enforce 
regulations. 
The findings demonstrate that private businesses take up proactive environmental 
behavior because of societal and market pressures, financial incentives of being 
environmentally responsible, upcoming stricter regulations, managing risks, and 
remaining legitimate among industry players. Thus, there are potential opportunities to 
use social comparison in environmental policy, but its effectiveness would be determined 
by how the policy is designed, such as the types of emission being compared, firms being 
targeted, implemental scale of the policy, amount of public interest on the emissions, 
accountability and dependability of the submitted information to avert greenwashing, and 
government support for low-ranked firms to raise their environmental performance and 




Interpretations of the Findings 
These findings correlate with the knowledge associated with incorporating social 
comparison into environmental policy that governs industries in various ways. In Chapter 
2, I reviewed the five factors that would nudge a for-profit business to voluntarily exceed 
its environmental governance, such as moral agency, normative behavior, political 
motivations, social power, and market considerations. The three isomorphic pressures 
that firms are subjected to, including coercive, normative, and mimetic elements, were 
also critiqued in the literature review to discern their impact on corporate environmental 
behavior. The research findings confirm these facets, except political motivations. 
For the code moral agency, only one policy advisor emphasized that CER is born 
from the executives’ desire to do the right thing. Three other advisors mentioned ethical 
considerations, but their statements were relatively weak. This affirms the assertion in the 
literature that the moral question is not a significant one in CER undertakings (Cheng-
Guajardo, 2019; Lampert, 2016; Vetterlein, 2018). Normative behavior and normative 
isomorphism were both equally underscored by the interviewees, followed by mimetic 
isomorphism; all participants verified the contention in the literature that firms are likely 
to model their operations after one another resulting from industry standardization and 
imitation (Lampert, 2016; Liu et al., 2018; Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). 
Further, policy advisors validated the existence of the social comparison phenomenon 
within the corporate community. All participants agreed that social power and market 
considerations were the two most important factors that influence CER activities, which 




strongly agree with nine out of 10 initial codes, the majority of the initial theoretical and 
conceptual framework (Table 2). 
Nevertheless, some findings did not align with the literature review. For example, 
no advisor mentioned the role that politics might play in motivating CER. The 
participants generally stressed that in administration, changes in government often mean 
changes in policy priorities, but none of them assigned any political influence on CER 
decision making. The literature indicates that, depending on the cultural values of the 
jurisdiction, corporate environmental behavior can be enjoined by the liberal or 
conservative leanings of the ruling government (Jeong & Kim, 2020). Such discrepancy 
does not necessarily disconfirm the knowledge, but it could signify that the notion of 
politics did not occur to any of the advisors during the interviews. 
Additionally, I excluded coercive isomorphism from the initial coding framework 
because CER was defined as a voluntary action for this dissertation, so regulatory 
requirements would be irrelevant. I was proven wrong as multiple participants stated that 
firms could become proactive with the intention of complying with potentially harsher 
regulations in the future and managing risks. Coercive isomorphism is partially 
expounded as direct or indirect pressures from laws and regulations, and the findings 
indicate that these requirements do not have to be existing, but they can be expected. This 
also inspires a paradox when it comes to regulations: Do current government policies 
force firms to change their way of doing business, or do firms, in anticipation of tougher 
policies, change first, so new policies are enacted to coerce firms to take further actions? 




The extension of knowledge does not end there. The policy advisors illuminated a 
long list of new codes that expand the initial theoretical and conceptual framework. In 
answering the warm-up questions, all participants agreed that policy work is always 
impacted by the prevailing political climate, so they felt the frustrations and the need to 
be patient because of the inconsistencies. This supports the argument that politics and 
administration cannot be separated. 
Politics-administration dichotomy, first proposed by Woodrow Wilson in the 
seminal essay The Study of Administration, is one of the key constructs in public 
administration study. Wilson (1887) hypothesized that politics should not manipulate the 
offices of administration even though the former sets the tasks for the latter. 
Administrative questions and political questions are independent of each other, so 
administration should always lie outside the sphere of politics (Wilson, 1887). The 
findings obtained from the advisors ratify the fallacy of this theory. Concomitantly, the 
findings also imply that any possibility of implementing a social comparison policy 
would be contingent on whether the current government is supportive of the idea. The 
Progressive Conservative Party, priding itself as a business-friendly administration, might 
be unwilling to single out firms by ranking and posting their emissions, so that could 
present a challenge to the prospective policy application. 
In addition to the confirmation of the initial theoretical and conceptual framework 
discussed above, there are other notable, though not extensive, findings that have helped 
expand the knowledge. For instance, according to the literature discussed in Chapter 2, 




successful and legitimate (Roszkowska-Menkesa & Aluchna, 2017). Based on the 
findings in this study, the technological innovations from industry leaders could also pave 
the way for others to follow suit, so if a social comparison policy were to be formulated, 
it might be beneficial to include these leaders in some way if the new technology is not 
subjected to business confidentiality. On top of the five factors and three isomorphic 
pressures that influence firms to implement CER in the initial theoretical and conceptual 
framework, the findings elucidate that firms might also go above and beyond due to their 
aspiration to obtain environmental certifications, so a social comparison policy could 
incorporate this component as well to nudge for action. 
Finally, the findings related to policy applicability in the literature gap extend the 
policy knowledge concerning the effectiveness of social comparison in the corporate 
context. The main solicitude is the policy design. To be certain how effective a 
prospective policy might be, details must be presented to evaluate its applicability. 
According to the findings, if a ranking system were to be introduced with emission 
information fully exposed to the public, the government would need to have a support 
system to help level the playing field, such as a reward program. Comparing firms alone 
might not be sufficient in pushing them into action, as they might not have the means or 
motivation to improve their emissions. In fact, social comparison could have a negative 
impact on some firms, causing apathy or defeatism if they were unable to keep up, 
rendering the policy ineffectual. 
In addition, the dependability of the data when firms submit their information 




accountable to their reporting, ensuring that greenwashing is not occurring. Social 
comparison could engender duplicity as firms do not want to look bad compared to their 
peers. The amount of public interest on the comparison would also be essential as societal 
pressures could fuel the competitive dynamics in social comparison. If the public did not 
care about the ranking because the emission type was not something they were concerned 
about, or the firms being compared were not the ones that they were familiar with, the 
ranking would not subsequently garner enough attention from the media or gain sufficient 
social momentum, and the firms might not respond to the social comparison policy at all. 
In summary, these findings show that simply ranking and posting firms’ 
emissions alone might not produce adequate social comparison effects. Policymakers 
must understand the mechanism of where the pressures for behavioral change would 
come from, such as public interest, market conditions, industry norms, financial 
incentives, future regulations, risk management, technological advancement, and 
environmental certifications. By incorporating these factors, along with a support 
program to assist low-ranked firms and an accountability system to check accuracy of the 
reporting, there might be potential opportunities to pursue a social comparison 
application in environmental policy, providing that the existing government supports the 
undertaking. 
Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations in the study that need to be perused. In Chapter 1, I 
raised the privacy of the participants as a major concern. This was addressed as the race, 




name the advisors. Triangulation was moderately achieved with three different sources of 
data within MECP, though it would be preferable if more policy advisors with an 
economic background participated to obtain more perceptions from the economic angle. 
The transferability of the findings might be mostly applicable only to western cultures as 
all the advisors were in Ontario, Canada, despite the interview questions being free of 
context and one advisor citing Indonesia as an example. Researcher bias was kept to 
minimal as throughout the interviews and the coding process, I was only interested in the 
truth from the data, and I openly discussed all the positive, neutral, and negative cases in 
the study. 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings and limitations, I propose several recommendations for 
future research. Because there are numerous factors that drive firms to practice CER, 
business leaders in the corporate community should be interviewed to harness their views 
and cross reference the data with the input from environmental policy advisors. It would 
also be advantageous to discuss with more policy advisors with an economic background 
to procure additional viewpoints on the subject, and recruit policymakers from traditional 
societies to weigh in their perceptions on the political relationships between businesses 
and governments and how they affect corporate environmental behavior. The latter would 
greatly enhance the transferability of the study 
In regard to the prospective policy itself, detailed design should be commenced to 
determine which emission types and firms should be compared that would ignite public 




managers, the benefits of environmental certifications, the latest proven environmental 
technologies that are economically feasible based on the targeted industries, and how 
regulations could be amended for the future. A support program for low-ranked firms 
should be formulated, as well as an accountability system to ensure the dependability of 
the submitted information. The detailed design could then be presented to policy advisors 
for their thoughts and feedback. 
Implications 
The implications for positive social change are vast. P8 mused at the end of the 
interview that the research succeeded in “asking the right questions,” “probing in the 
right area,” and “getting [them] thinking, which is good.” This study might have provided 
a deeper understanding on CER decision making, which could be a valuable insight for 
policymakers as they formulate and implement environmental policies. Without a doubt, 
encouraging for-profit businesses to actively participate in environmental matters is a 
favorable endeavor as it would improve administrative efficiencies and safeguard public 
welfare. It might also help create a competitive ecology on environmental performance 
within the private sector so firms could vie for better public relations, enabling them to 
profit from stronger market positions. The affordable housing investments made by 
Apple, Facebook, and Google reveal that such ecology is probable. 
The research might have also advanced the knowledge on the use of corporate 
social comparison nudge in environmental policy, so firms might voluntarily and 
proactively become more environmentally responsible, promoting broader CER practices. 




undertake various socially responsible behaviors, such as pay equity, workplace health 
and safety, racial and gender hiring practices, and others. 
There are theoretical implications as well. The research may have shone light on a 
new policy application of social comparison in the corporate context. Social comparison 
has always been used in policy to nudge individual behavior, but not corporate behavior. 
This study has shown that there is potentiality for such a policy tool, depending on its 
design. 
Conclusion 
When it comes to the environment, it has been incontrovertible for decades that 
the government is no longer the sole caretaker. Corporate players must be actively 
involved to battle future environmental challenges. Tax breaks and other economic policy 
tools have always been used to incentivize firms in being more environmentally 
responsible, but they are often not politically popular in the age of fiscal frugality. The 
use of nudge, particularly social comparison, in environmental policy could promote that 
proactivity without the need for pecuniary measures because of firms’ natural tendencies 
to make profits and maintain a good public image. However, the effectiveness is by no 
means guaranteed, and the prospective policy must be carefully crafted to optimize its 
applicability. The potential application is not only limited to environmental protection, 
but also to other policy areas that require corporate partaking. It is a notion that modern 
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Appendix A: Participant Recruitment 
Dear (potential participant name): 
I hope this note finds you well. My name is Enoch Tse and I am a PhD student at 
Walden University. I am inviting you to participate in a research study about the 
practicality of using policy to encourage companies to be more environmentally proactive 
by publicly ranking and posting their emissions. I am seeking environmental policy 
professionals who are familiar with air or carbon emissions and/or environmental 
economics to be in the study. Would you be interested in taking part? 
The interview will include completing an Informed Consent statement, which I 
will email to you. I will also provide you some sample interview questions we will be 
discussing. 
The interview process should take 60 to 90 minutes of your time. Please let me 
know if you would like to participate. I will follow up with a telephone call in five (5) 
business days to further explain the process and answer any questions you might have. 
You can also contact me by email enoch.tse@waldenu.edu if you have any questions. 










Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
The following questions will be used in the interviews: 
Warm-up questions 
• What do you like most about working in the policy field? 
• What do you find most challenging about your job? 
Interview questions 
1) What are your thoughts about the companies that proactively reduce their 
emissions to go above and beyond compliance? 
a) Why do you think companies do that? 
2) What are your thoughts about the companies that imitate the business 
practices of the proactive companies? 
a) Why do you think so? Tell me more about that. 
3) How does it seem to impact their own environmental responsibility? 
a) Why do you think companies imitate their peers? Why does that matter? 
4) How effective do you think it might be to compare companies by ranking and 
posting their emissions publicly as a way to get them to improve their 
emissions? 
a) What is your rationale for your answer? Why do you say that?  
5) Is there anything else you would like to add? 
To close the interview, I will sincerely thank the interviewee for their time and 
valuable input. I will then discuss the debriefing process, and also about sharing the 
results of data analysis at the end of the study. 
